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INTRODUCTION 
In this brief, the parties and key witnesses will be 
referred to as follows: 
"Mr. Onyeabor" — Emmanuel Onyeabor, the plaintiff, 
age 29 at the time of the accident; 
a native of Nigeria. 
"Liz Onyeabor" — The wife of Emmanuel Onyeabor. 
"Mrs. Bates" — Pam Bates, one of the defendants, and 
wife of the owner of the corporate 
defendant, Pro Roofing, Inc. 
"Pro Roofing" — Pro Roofing, Inc., a Utah corporation, 
owned in part by Phil Bates, husband of 
Pam Bates. 
"Dr. Clark" -- Lincoln Clark, M.D., a psychiatrist at 
the University of Utah who testified 
on behalf of the defense. 
Other witnesses will be identified in the context of the argument 
presented. 
The record will be referred to as "(R. )." 
References to the transcript will be designated as "(T. M- )," 
using the clerk's volume reference (19 volumes, A through S) and 
the reporter's page numbers. When certain lines on a page are 
referenced, for example Volume D, page 126, lines 3-14, this 
format will be used: "(T. D-126:3-14)." Exhibits will be 
referred to as "Ex. ," and pages within exhibits as "Ex. 
38:1, 5, 8," to refer to pages 1, 5 and 8 of Exhibit 38. 
The Appendix will be abbreviated as "App." Some 
important sections of transcript and frequently referred-to 
exhibits are attached in the separately-bound Appendix. 
viii 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
by virtue of Utah Code Ann. 1953 §78-2a-3(h) (1987) and Utah Code 
Ann. 1953 §78-2-2(3)(i) and (4)(g) (1987). This is an appeal 
from a district court directly to the Utah pupreme Court, which 
has been "poured over" to the Court of Appeals. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING BFLOW AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellant in this case, Emmanuel Onyeabor, filed an 
action in Third District Court of Salt Lake County based upon 
personal injuries that he received in an automobile accident that 
occurred on June 15, 1984. Mr. Onyeabor sustained a closed-head, 
organic brain injury as well as a herniated lumbar disc. The 
case was tried to a jury beginning February 2, 1987, and 
continuing through February 18, 1987, when the jury returned a 
verdict in favor of plaintiff, but awarding only the sum of 
$16,850.00. The verdict was reduced by 251% due to a finding of 
contributory negligence on the part of Mr. Onyeabor (R. 658). A 
motion for a new trial and for an additur were both denied on 
April 1, 1987 (R. 720-1). This appeal was timely taken from the 
Judgment on Jury Verdict and the Order denying the Motion for a 
New Trial and Additur with Notice of Appeal being filed on April 
30, 1987 (R. 722). 
ix 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the court make comments oh the evidence which 
indicated a preference for the defendant's side of the case? 
2. Did the trial court comment oh the evidence by 
exhibiting a hostile, negative attitude toward Mr. Onyeaborfs 
case by means of its demeanor, facial expressions, tone of voice, 
and harsh manner in addressing plaintiff's counsel? 
3. Should the court have excluded the surprise 
testimony of Dr. Lincoln Clark, a psychiatrist, where notice of 
this expert witness was not submitted to Mr, Onyeabor until six 
(6) business days prior to trial? 
4. Did the court erroneously exclude other relevant 
evidence? 
5. Did the court commit reversible error by 
instructing the jury that it could find Mr. Onyeabor to be 
contributorily negligent where the evidence was insufficient to 
establish his failure to keep a proper lookout or to drive at a 
safe speed under the conditions? 
6. Was there insufficient evidence to justify a 
verdict for the defendants that Mr. Onyeabotf was 25% negligent, 
and that his total damages amounted to only $16,850.00? 
7. Did the court abuse its discretion in failing to 
grant plaintiff's Motions for an Additur or New Trial? 
8. Though some errors individually might not be 
grounds for reversal, did the collective weight of the numerous 
errors in this case deny plaintiff a fair trial? 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. DETAILS OF THE ACCIDENT 
On June 15, 1984, plaintiff was employed as a 
carpenter on a construction project in Midvale, Utah. He was 
traveling home for lunch at approximately 1:10 to 1:20 p.m. 
(T. 1-81), proceeding north on 900 East, approximately 250 to 300 
feet from the intersection of 7100 South (T. C-115-117, K-49:20; 
Ex. 5). The posted speed limit was 45 mph and he was traveling 
approximately 40 to 45 mph (T. B-58; 1-81). 
The defendant, Pam Bates, had just stopped at a bank 
in a shopping center on the east side of 900 East and was on her 
way to perform an errand for her husband's company, defendant Pro 
Roofing. She intended to leave some papers at Pro Roofing, which 
required her to travel westbound on 7100 South (T. L-14-15). 
Ninth East is a four-lane highway divided by a median 
strip. It has two lanes northbound and a left-hand turn lane for 
westbound traffic, which begins approximately 100 feet from the 
white lines marking the crosswalk of the intersection (Exs. 1, 4). 
There is also a right-hand turn lane which begins slightly south 
of the point where defendant's vehicle entered the roadway (Ex. 
1). 
Mrs. Bates' vehicle pulled to the edge of 900 East and 
stopped to observe the traffic (T. L-16), while she looked in a 
southerly direction. At that time, her vehicle would have been 
situated approximately ten feet to the north of the telephone 
pole shown in Exhibit 4, pictures A, B, I and Jf with the front 
of the vehicle pointed almost due west (T. £-53). She was 
intending to make a left turn (i.e., westbound) onto 7100 South, 
approximately 100 feet to her north at that moment. She drove 
directly across the three traffic lanes (the right-hand turn lane 
and the two northbound lanes) at almost a right angle in order to 
get into the left-hand turn lane on 900 East (T. B-50, K-49-.12 
and C-108:12), so that she could turn west. 
The Bates1 vehicle was struck by Mr. Onyeabor's vehicle 
a few feet north of the "hash marks" on the road as shown on 
Exhibit 4, photographs C, D, E, K and L (T. C-74-75). Mrs. Bates 
indicated to the investigating officer that she didn't see the 
plaintiff's vehicle "because of a white truck" (Ex. 2; T. B-47). 
The plaintiff's vehicle skidded approximately 105 feet (Exs. 2, 
5A). The turn in the skid was intended to show the relative 
location of the point of impact (T. B-56; Ex. 5A). This would 
indicate approximately 60 feet of skid priori to the impact and 45 
feet after impact (T. C-113:6). 
The right side of the plaintiff's vehicle impacted the 
left rear bumper of the Bates' vehicle at the door joint (T. 
C-69), causing plaintiff to lurch violently forward (T. C-122). 
The place where the bumper of the Bates' vehicle "hooked" into 
the side of the plaintiff's vehicle is shown in Exhibit 2, 
pictures B, C and D. Mr. Onyeabor testified that his left wheels 
also struck the median strip causing him to be jostled severely 
(T. C-118-119, 122) and causing tire damage (Ex. 8). He also 
lost the steering wheel momentarily at approximately the time of 
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impact (T. 1-84), causing his body to be a "free object" in 
motion inside the car (T. C-122:12-25). 
Mr. Onyeabor testified that his head struck the 
steering wheel and/or parts or the left top interior of the 
vehicle (T. 1-84). The position in which Mr. Onyeabor, a large 
man, was sitting in this particular vehicle lend strong support 
to that theory, as shown by Exhibit 3, photographs A through I, 
particularly photograph K. 
Based upon the testimony of Dennis Andrews (a former 
highway patrolman and an accident reconstruction expert), it was 
estimated that Mr. Onyeabor's vehicle was traveling at 
approximately 28 to 33 mph at the time of impact. Mr. Andrews 
estimated the Bates' vehicle to be going north at approximately 5 
mph (T. C-108), and Mrs. Bates estimated her speed at "under 10 
mph" (T. L-17). This means that the speed differential of the 
vehicles was approximately 23 to 29 mph at impact (T. C-108). 
Officer Leavitt estimated Mr. Onyeabor's vehicle to have a speed 
of 15 to 20 mph at impact for a speed differential of 10 to 15 
mph (T. C-64). Both of these gentlemen were of the opinion that 
this would probably cause Mr. Onyeabor to strike his head on the 
steering wheel with some significant force (T. C-72 and C-122). 
B. COMMENTS ON THE EVIDENCE 
The court made numerous prejudicial comments on the 
evidence in at least the following respects: the court expressed 
opinions on the believability of expert witnesses and the quality 
of the evidence; the court questioned witnesses; the court made 
prejudicial statements regarding the use of exhibit notebooks by 
4 
the juryf in front of the jury, which tended to cast the 
documentary evidence in the case in a negative light; the court 
allowed counsel to argue the admissibility or non-admissibility 
of evidence in front of the jury, during which argumentation 
prejudicial comments were made by the defense; the court made 
extraneous prejudicial statements in ruling on the admissibility 
of certain evidence, which was prejudicial; the court unduly 
limited Mr. Onyeaborfs cross-examination of witnesses; and the 
court repeatedly interrupted counsel and witnesses without cause 
and made numerous prejudicial comments in so doing (see Tables T 
and II below). These facts are discussed in more detail in Point 
I below with numerous additional citations to the record. 
From the very outset of the case, there was an attitude 
of distrust and prejudice exhibited toward Mr. Onyeabor and his 
counsel. This attitude was reflected in the court's demeanor 
including facial expressions, sighs, frowns, and body language 
(Apps. 36-39). This attitude was also shown by the frequent 
refusal to allow counsel to approach the bench on important 
issues (T. B-46, C-76, 1-103). In general, the court was very 
harsh with Mr. Onyeabor's counsel in front of the jury, 
particularly during the first three days of trial (T. D-443-444). 
C. FACTS REGARDING DR. LINCOLN CLARK 
During the course of the litigation of this case, there 
were five separate trial dates set: 8/14/85, 4/18/86, 11/17/86, 
12/8/86 and 2/2/87 (R. 18, 100, 124, 199, 302). Mr. Onyeabor•s 
current counsel entered the case in July of 1986, and promptly 
amended the complaint, setting forth the issue of brain injury 
5 
and damages more precisely (R. 145). Since the trial was at that 
point scheduled for November 17f 1986 (R. 124 )f the defense 
immediately moved for an independent mental examination of the 
plaintiff under Rule 35, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, with the 
examination to be performed by Edward C. Beck, Ph.D., a 
psychologist (R. 155). Dr. Beck apparently got sick, so on 
November 8, 1986, defendants again moved for a continuance of the 
trial (R. 252). That motion stated the following regarding the 
planned efforts to obtain a new defense expert: 
The undersigned further represents that he 
will use all reasonable efforts to obtain 
the services of a substitute expert as 
rapidly as possible consistent with an 
adequate presentation of the case. The 
undersigned further represents that he will 
use all reasonable efforts to cooperate with 
plaintifff s attorney in providing an 
opportunity to him to discover the substance 
of the expert's evaluation and opinion. 
(Emphasis added) 
(R. 255). On November 10, 1986, the Motion for Continuance was 
heard, and the court continued the trial until December 8, 1986 
(R. 199). 
During that period, the defendants procured a 
substitute expert, Dr. Lincoln Clark, a University of Utah 
psychiatrist. For some reason, Dr. Clark was not able to examine 
Mr. Onyeabor until December 2, 1986 (T. L-88). After his 
examination, Dr. Clark told defense counsel that he was 
frightened by Mr. Onyeabor, and that he did not wish to 
participate any further and would categorically not be a witness 
at the trial (T. S-19). Dr. Clark admitted that he had not been 
threatened by Mr. Onyeabor; he was simply fearful (T. S-18:6). 
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Defendants moved for a continuance, which was 
strenuously opposed by Mr. Onyeabor because of his medical and 
psychological condition (T. 3-19-21). Dr. Clark was thereafter 
summoned before the court on December 5, 1986, and examined on 
the record by Judge Dee. Dr. Clark testified that he would not 
under any circumstances testify at trial and that his decision 
was final and irrevocable. He stated: 
••• I've already expressed I want out of this. 
I mean I made that very clear at the 
beginning. And I regret the inconvenience 
and everything else it has caused, and I wish 
it could be otherwise. I would otherwise be 
happy to proceed even with this short notice 
involved — that's involved. But I simply — 
and I say I thought about this very seriously 
before T came to this conclusion because I 
had a certain reputation — myselfc, I'm 
concerned about as a witness, and I don't 
want to compromise that, but I am not about 
to take, as I look at it, an unreasonable 
risk to myself and my family and the 
apprehensions this could cause. Knd I'm not 
going to change my mind. (Emphasis added) 
(T. S-18-19). 
Based upon these circumstances, Jkidge Dee reluctantly 
ordered a fourth continuance of the trial to allow the defendants 
to procure yet another substitute expert witness in the head 
injury area to replace Dr. Clark (T. S-26-27). On December 16, 
1986, Mr. Stegall confirmed to Mr. Onyeabor's counsel that the 
defense expert would be Dr. Robert Cook. On December 17, 1986, 
the parties appeared before Judge Dee for a scheduling 
conference, and the new trial date of February 2, 1987, was set 
(R. 302). Mr. Onyeabor was examined by Dr. Cook in Salt Lake 
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City, in mid-January (T. K-89), and his deposition was 
pre-scheduled with counsel for Monday, January 26, 1987, in 
Denver (App. 40, p. 3). 
On Thursday, January 22, 1987, exactly six business 
days prior to trial, Mr. Onyeabor's counsel received a revised 
witness list from Mr. Stegall (R. 308), which included Dr. 
Lincoln Clark as a proposed witness! This was the first notice 
that Mr. Onyeabor had regarding the possibility that Dr. Clark 
would again be a witness since the time of his "irrevocable11 
withdrawal from the case on December 5, 1986. Mr. Stegall was 
out of town from Friday, January 23, 1987, until Tuesday, January 
27, 1987. 
It was difficult to schedule a Motion in Limine because 
Judge Dee was retiring effective January 31, 1987, and he felt 
that the judge assigned to trial should hear any such motions. 
The first opportunity to schedule a motion before Judge Croft was 
Friday, January 30, 1987, and Judge Croft denied the Motion in 
Limine (R. 326? T. Q-54). 
At the hearing on the Motion in Limine, Mr. Stegall 
indicated that he had known about Dr. Clark's availability since 
"the first part of January" (T. Q-38). Dr. Clark testified at 
trial that he decided to come back into the case some time around 
Christmas 1986 (T. L-127-128). Nothing about the possibility of 
Dr. Clark's reappearance was ever communicated to plaintiff's 
counsel despite many opportunities (App. 40). 
Mr. Onyeabor's counsel did not receive a written report 
from Dr. Clark on the results of his examination until the third 
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day of trial, February 4, 1987. The report was incomplete in 
that it did not render a diagnosis of Mr. Onyeabor (App. 41:7). 
Dr. Clark testified convincingly at trial (L-76-80, 
91-3, 94, 96-97, 103-104, 156-158, 192-193), rendering an opinion 
that Mr. Onyeabor suffered numerous pre-existing psychological 
problems (T. L-192-193). 
These facts are further amplified in Point II below. 
D. FACTS REGARDING THE EVIDENCE 
The facts relevant to the evidentiary errors are as 
follows: 
The court excluded Exhibit 114, a video tape of a 
crash, relevant to show the probability of head injury (T. C-146, 
122-128), despite significant testimony that the tape illustrated 
the principle of sudden deceleration (T. C-124-126). On several 
occasions, the court prohibited or seriously hindered counsel 
from establishing scientific treatises as authoritative, or using 
them in cross-examination of defense witnesses (T. M-32-36, 
37-39, 49-53; D-444-445, 452; F-841-842). The court excluded the 
testimony of important rebuttal witnesses Cf. M-97-102). The 
court refused to allow Mr. Onyeaborfs wife to render important 
testimony regarding his future plans which was relevant to lost 
earning capacity (T. J-143). The court refused to allow Officer 
Leavitt to testify as to who was at fault in causing the accident 
(T. B-59-62). The court excluded Exhibit 75, a purchase order, 
offered to show that Mr. Onyeabor had a substantial business in 
Nigeria, and therefore had lost substantial earning capacity due 
to the accident (T. G-152). Additional facts having to do with 
these evidentiary matters are discussed below in Point III. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The court repeatedly commented on the evidence 
throughout the trial. Many of the comments on the evidence came 
in the form of direct statements that indicated the court's view 
on the quality or credibility of the evidence, and favored the 
position of the defendants. The court also interrupted and 
interjected comments in such a manner as to indicate the court's 
attitude towards the merits of the cause. The court's demeanor, 
including facial expressions, body language, tone of voice, 
harshness towards plaintiff's counsel, and other similar things, 
indicated that the court disbelieved Mr. Onyeabor's witnesses and 
was hostile to Mr. Onyeabor's case. The cumulative effect of 
these actions was severely prejudicial and constituted reversible 
error. 
2. Dr. Lincoln Clark, a University of Utah 
psychiatrist, was hired as a defense expert witness but later 
stated that he was withdrawing irrevocably from the case. He did 
not write a report and was not deposed. Defendants procured 
another expert. Six business days before the new trial date, Dr. 
Clark's name was again submitted as an expert; his written report 
was not provided until the third day of trial. Plaintiff did not 
have time to do discovery on Dr. Clark's opinion and his presence 
in the case was highly prejudicial to plaintiff. 
3. The court excluded several significant pieces of 
evidence which affected the outcome of the case. For example, 
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the court refused Exhibit 114, a video tape showing an automobile 
crash at 5 and 21 mph, wherein the "dummy" driver in each case 
struck its head on the windshield hard enough to make a 
significant bulls-eye breakage pattern. This could have helped 
to disprove defense claims that this accident was too mild to 
cause the brain injury complained of by Mr. Onyeabor. Other 
significant evidence was also excluded. 
4. There was no evidence that Mr. Onyeabor was in any 
way negligent, or contributed to the cause of the accident. The 
court nevertheless instructed the jury that it could find Mr. 
Onyeabor contributorily negligent on the theory that he might 
have been driving too fast for conditions, or might have failed 
to maintain a proper lookout. As a result, the jury was confused 
and found Mr. Onyeabor 25% negligent. 
5. The verdict finding 25% negligence on the part of 
the plaintiff and awarding only $16,850.00 in damages was the 
result of passion and prejudice. Mr. Onyeabor undisputedly 
received a herniated disc from the accident, and there was no 
substantial admissible evidence to contest the fact that he had a 
brain injury with significant impairment resulting therefrom. 
The court should have granted an additur in the amount of at 
least $300,000.00, or, in the alternative, a new trial. 
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POINT I. 
Comments On The Evidence Prejudiced The Jury 
IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO COMMENT 
ON THE EVIDENCE EITHER DIRECTLY BY ORAL STATEMENTS OR 
INDIRECTLY IN THE FORM OF ITS DEMEANOR, FACIAL 
EXPRESSIONS, AND THE LIKE. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF 
REPEATED INTERJECTIONS BY THE COURT WITH RESPECT TO THE 
QUALITY OR BELIEVABILITY OF THE EVIDENCE CONSTITUTED 
REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
AND 
APPLICABLE RULES OF LAW 
Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "The 
Court shall not comment on the evidence in the case ..." It is 
error for the court to comment on the quality or credibility of 
the evidence in such a way as to indicate that it favors the 
claims or the position of either party. State v. Sanders, 27 
Utah 2d 354, 496 P.2d 70 (1972); State v. Long, 721 P.2d 493 at 
496 (Hall, C.J. concurring and dissenting) (Utah 1986). Chief 
Justice Hall stated the rule and its basis as follows: 
[A] trial judge is not permitted to comment 
on the quality or credibility of the 
evidence and may not indicate that the 
evidence is either weak or convincing. ... 
The court is ... enjoined from commenting on 
the quality or credibility of the evidence in 
such a way as to indicate that it favors the 
claims or position of either party. The 
enjoinder is necessary to prevent any 
intrusion upon the prerogatives of the jury 
to judge the credibility of the evidence and 
to determine the facts. (Concurring and 
dissenting opinion) (Emphasis added) 
Id. at 496. 
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If the error was of sufficiently substantial a nature 
that it is reasonable to believe that it adversely affected the 
appellant or deprived him of a fair trial ih such a way that in 
the absence of the error there is reasonably likelihood that the 
outcome would have been different, reversal is warranted. Del 
Porto v. Nicolo, 27 Utah 2d 286, 495 P.2d 8U, 814 (1972); Matter 
of Kesler, 702 P.2d 86, 96 (Utah 1985). 
Direct statements by a judge can obviously constitute 
comments on the evidence. The court's demeanor, however, 
including facial expressions, gestures and actions, can also 
amount to a comment on the evidence. Fgede^ -Nissen v. Crystal 
Mountain, Inc., 606 P.2d 1214 at 1222 (Wash. 1980). Furthermore, 
if either a statement or an action can be reasonably interpreted 
to indicate the court's belief or disbelief concerning the 
veracity of witnesses, it falls in the category of a comment on 
the evidence. Jd.. Comments made during a trial which influence 
the jury concerning the merits of the case, or which affect 
substantial rights of litigants, constitute grounds for reversal. 
Messier v. Simmons Gun Specialties, Inc., 687 P.2d 121 at 129 
(Okla. 1984). 
Interjections and interruptions n^ ay constitute a 
comment on the evidence, particularly wherd they occur or are 
"phrased in a manner indicative of the count's attitude towards 
the merits of the case ..." Egede-Nissen, supra at 1222. The 
cumulative effect of repeated interjection$ by the court or 
comments on the evidence may constitute reversible error, even 
though each such interjection, standing alc^ ne, might not be error. 
Egede-Nissen, supra at 1223. 
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ARGUMENT 
- Introduction -
The allegation that a trial court prejudicially 
interjected itself into a trial should not be lightly made; nor 
when made, should it be slighted by a reviewing court. 
Eqede-Nissen, supra at 1221. The allegations made in this case 
are not lightly made. Tn nearly 14 years of practice, counsel 
has never encountered a situation such as that which occurred in 
this trial. The arguments made herein, though strong, should not 
be viewed as a personal attack on the trial court. The sad 
events which transpired in this trial undoubtedly were not 
consciously intended to cause damage to Mr. Onyeabor. 
Nonetheless, the incidents occurred as reported herein and cannot 
be ignored if justice is to be done. 
There was potential for prejudice in this case from the 
outset, even under the best of intentions. For example, the 
possibility of racial prejudice on the part of the jury was 
strong, regardless of attempts to guard against it. Mr. Onyeabor 
is black and foreign. He was a citizen of the African country of 
Nigeria and spoke with an accent. He was married to a Caucasian 
woman, Liz Onyeabor, who was an important witness for him; she 
was eight months pregnant at the time of the trial. It is highly 
unlikely that the average jury venire would admit racial 
prejudices in an open courtroom on voir dire. It was, therefore, 
extremely important that the court itself make every effort to 
avoid any appearance of prejudice or bias. 
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- The Judge's Comments On The Belidvability And 
Quality of Expert Testimony Prejudij ced The Jury -
One author recently commented on tjhe importance of a 
judge at trial as follows: 
To whom does a jury look first fort guidance 
in the course of a trial? The trijal judge, 
of course. Everyone knows that lawyers can't 
be trusted and the parties have axes to 
grind. But the judge is impartial!. The 
judge is knowledgeable. The judg^ wears a 
robe! The judge is the monarchf and the 
courtroom is the kingdom. It helps a party 
if the jury thinks that the judge is 
sympathetic to that party's cause 
trial judges try hard not to show 
but most 
favoritism 
in front of the jury. (Emphasis added) 
The Trial Practice Newsletter, David F. Binder, Esq.f p. 2, 
Shepard's/McGraw-Hillf February 1987. Jurots tend to look upon 
the judge with a great degree of faith. They have no idea 
whether the judge is making an erroneous ruling or is otherwise 
acting improperly. If the jury perceives that the judge favors 
one side in a given case, it is devastating to the hapless 
opponent. This happened at the Onyeabor tr|al. 
The trial judge commented directly on the believability 
or quality of the plaintiff's expert testimony on at least 14 
occasions during the 12-day trial (See Tabl£ I). For example, 
Mr. Onyeabor attempted to prove the economic value of his future 
lost earning capacity by establishing that he had developed 
"worker skills" by virtue of his occupation in Nigeria that were 
transferable to occupations in the United States. To do this, 
Mr. Onyeabor called as an expert witness Mr. Alan Heal, a 
certified rehabilitation counselor with a master's degree in 
vocational rehabilitation counseling. Mr. fteal had ten years 
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TABLE I 
DIRECT COMMENTS ON EVIDENCE BY TRIAL COURT 
| Very SeriousH 
App. Day of Witness Name/ Transcript 
No. Trial/Date Called By Vol,/Page Substance and Effect of Comment on Evidence 
2. 
8 - 2/11 Alan Heal (P) J 175-180, 
182 
8 - 2/12 Boyd Pjeldsted K 18-22 
(P) 
3. 
4. 
5. 
7 
11 
7 
- 2/10 
- 2/17 
- 2/10 
Edward Spencer 
M.D. (D) 
Linda Gummow, 
Ph.D. (P) 
Linda Gummow, 
Ph.D. (P) 
I 
M 
H 
45-46 
29-30 
29-31 
2/04 Thomas 
Soderberg, M.D. 
Gerald Moress, 
M. D. 
Richard 
Nielsen, M.D. 
(P) 
Court expresses doubt that Mr. Onyeabor will ever go out and get a job as a 
superintendent of a construction project; casts doubt on Heal's opinion as to 
what Onyeabor would have made and interjects statements that emphasize that 
Heal's opinion is not valid for the U.S. but only for Nigeria; casts doubt 
upon Onyeabor's income potential. 
Judge casts doubt on validity of expert's testimony as to value of lost future 
earnings by referring to it as "pure speculation"; reveals his opinion of Mr. 
Onyeabor's earning potential by allowing only testimony of $5.00 per hour. 
Interjects comments that emphasize negative aspects of witness's testimony 
about Onyeabor. 
Judge offered opinion that counsel had not asked a certain question; (he was 
wrong - see T. 193-4 (2/12)). 
Court indicates sua sponte opinion that expert is not qualified to render an 
opinion as to whether Onyeabor was unconscious at scene because expert wasn't 
present. 
D 325, 333, Judge discredits documentary evidence by making disparaging comments about use 
348, 382, of exhibit notebooks given to jurors at beginning of trial; severely scolds 
383, 443, counsel in front of jury. 
444 
7. 11 - 2/17 Linda Gummow, 
Ph.D. (P) 
M 49-53 On issue of using treatises to rebut prior witness's testimony, judge makes 
numerous comments that cast discredit upon plaintiff's expert by expressing 
dubiety on methods employed by the witness. 
TABLE I CONTINUED 
App. Day of Witness Name/ Transcript 
No. Trial/Date Called By Vol./Page Substance and Effect of Comment on Evidence 
Serious 
8. 2 - 2/03 
9. 2 -
Dennis Leavitt, C 76-79 
(P) 
10. 3-4 
11. 5 
2/03 
2/04-
2/05 
2/06 
Dennis Leavitt, 
Officer (P) 
Richard Goka 
M.D. (P) 
Linda Gummow 
Ph.D. (P) 
C 
D 
E 
F 
72 
483-
495-6 
845 
12. 
13. 
14. 
3 -
8 -
2 -
2/04 
2/11 
2/03 
Patrick Chukwu 
(P) 
Elizabeth 
Onyeabor (P) 
Dennis Andrews 
(P) 
D 
J 
C 
295 
132-135 
142-144 
Judge expresses doubt that Onyeabor's car struck center median, causing him 
to be jostled; casts plaintiff's theory of mechanism of injury into doubt; 
and cross-examines witness. 
Judge comments that the officer's experience did not justify him in express-
ing opinion that Onyeabor could have struck head; casts doubt on plaintiff's 
theory of head trauma causing brain injury. 
Judge says he is "troubled" by a glossary of terms and states that most words 
used by the doctor "don't mean a thing to us ... I am sure they don't to the 
jury"; effectively casts doubt on testimony of expert medical witnesses. 
Judge interjects sua sponte and cuts off witness who is explaining future 
risk of head injury to plaintiff; thereby implies little risk. 
rTmportarTtl 
Judge refers to Nigerian witness as one of "these young ones," demeaning this 
witness and other younger Nigerians who had previously testified. 
Casts doubt about ability of wife to have knowledge of and comment on why 
plaintiff took certain classes more than once, and why he had certain grades. 
Questions witness sua sponte about details of accident leaving impression 
that witness was perhaps not thorough. 
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experience in the fieldf and was well-qualified to assess 
impaired earning capacity (T. J-150-154). 
Mr. Heal determined Mr. Onyeaborfs pre-existing worker 
traits by an examination of his work life prior to the accident 
(T. J-153). He valued those traits in part by the income Mr. 
Onyeabor made in Nigeria, together with his job history and 
worker traits (T. J-153-157). (Mr. Onyeabor had produced a tax 
certificate and evidence of the exchange rate; See Exs. 12 and 
13.) Mr. Heal considered both Nigerian and U.S. jobs when he 
formed his opinion as to impaired earning capacity (T. J-175). 
Mr. Heal was asked the value of the impaired earning 
capacity, and the defense objected claiming that the value 
depended on whether Mr. Onyeabor returned to Nigeria (T. J-176). 
The court then interjected several prejudicial comments in the 
presence of the jury about the quality and believability of this 
testimony (See Appendix 1): 
(The Court) If he [sic] assuming that he 
can step out into the job as superintendent 
in a construction job, that's in the United 
States, at that point in time we don't know. 
... Well, I think I will let him testify to 
that in case the jury thinks Mr. Onyeabor 
could go out and get a job of a 
superintendent of a construction based upon 
the evidence that they have heard. Then they 
can use that figure. If they don't [i.e., 
believe the evidence] they don't need to. 
(Emphasis added) 
(T. J-176:23, 177:17; App. 1). After considerable argumentation 
in front of the jury as to the appropriateness of the 
occupational expert's assumptions (T. J-178-179), Mr. Heal 
stated that he had directly observed the activities of "job 
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superintendent." Based on this observation in combination with 
Mr. Onyeaborfs job history, Mr. Heal believed Mr. Onyeabor could 
be a job superintendent. Mr. Onyeaborfs counsel asked about the 
income of a person with the skill description of job 
superintendent (T. J-179:21). Mr. Heal's answer was based upon 
his opinion of Mr. Onyeabor's capacity to perform this type of 
work (T. J-180:l-9). The court then observed, with a note of 
doubt: "Well, that may be his opinion, yes* (T. J-180:10). The 
court indicated further doubt about the quality of the testimony 
when it said a few lines later: 
Well, that's where these United Spates jobs, 
it seems to me, are relevant and important in 
his opinion. (Emphasis added) 
(T. J-180:16; App. 1). This sounds like defense closing 
argument, i.e., Mr. Heal's testimony was suspect because his 
evaluation of impaired earning capacity was based in part upon 
what Mr. Onyeabor did in Nigeria (see also Jf-182:8), and what he 
did in Nigeria is not trustworthy. The evaluation of Mr. Heal's 
testimony should have been left to the jury. The court should 
not have intervened on the side of the defendant. 
The next day, the court seriously compounded this error 
with another comment on the evidence. Mr. Onyeabor called Boyd 
Fjeldsted, a Senior Research Economist at the University of Utah, 
to place an economic value upon Mr. Onyeabor's loss (App. 2). 
Mr. Fjeldsted was asked about a number of possible scenarios for 
a starting wage, given Mr. Onyeabor's history. At that point, 
the judge jumped in with these extremely prejudicial comments, 
apparently designed to emphasize the defense viewpoint that any 
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consideration of the work skills gained by Mr. Onyeabor in 
Nigeria was somehow irrelevant: 
MR. SYKES: ... I am trying to make a 
differential calculation that would take some 
of this into account, presumably. That's 
what I am trying to do. 
THE COURT: Well, what did he do Mr. 
Fjeldsted? Did he give any consideration to 
his earning rate — his earning rate in this 
country? 
MR. SYKES: I think by the ~ 
THE COURT: Just answer the question. 
Did he give any consideration to that earning 
rate since he has been in this country in 
making any calculation? (Emphasis added) 
(T. K-18-19; App. 2). After some discussion about the basis of 
the calculation, the court further commented: 
Seems to me it is pure speculation in the 
first year he is going to make $6.00 an hour, 
and the next year $10.00 an hour, and the 
next year $15.00 an hour. I think that is 
pure speculation. ... Well what hourly 
rates are you using? Did you have him use in 
this? 
MR. SYKES: I can either show them to 
you or I can tell you right now. 
THE COURT: Well, show them to me. The 
trouble with this, as far as I am concerned, 
is that it assumes facts that are clearly not 
in evidence, and we have no basis for 
believing that this progress will be one that 
should be considered rather than a thousand 
others, you see. (Emphasis added) 
(T. K-20:4, 21:17). 
The judge finally allowed in only testimony to the 
effect that Mr. Onyeabor could make $5.00 per hour for the rest 
of his life (T. B-22:8), despite significant expert testimony by 
Mr. Heal to the contrary (T. J-153-157). A reasonable jury would 
conclude that the court personally believed that Mr. Onyeaborfs 
evidence on earning capacity of $40,000 per year was greatly 
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exaggerated because the court had indicated that the only 
believable evidence on Mr. Onyeaborfs capacity was $5.00 per hour, 
That should have been solely the juryfs decision. 
The judge was very one-sided in his interjections and 
comments, which tended to emphasize negative aspects about Mr. 
Onyeabor. For example, during the cross-examination of Dr. 
Edward Spencer, a well-knownf defense-oriented orthopedic surgeon 
(App. 3), Mr. Onyeabor's counsel quoted a section of Dr. 
Spencer's report with the intention to question him on how it 
related to a previous medical examination. (T. 1-45:20). The 
court interrupted sua sponte and interjected a gratuitous comment 
which highlighted those aspects of the passage "negative" to the 
plaintiff. This interjection provided Dr. Spencer, a hostile 
witness, an opportunity to inject additional negative comments 
about the plaintiff: 
Q (Mr. Sykes): In the report that you 
wrote, didn't you say ... [varioup things 
quoted]? 
A (Dr. Spencer): That's rigjit. 
THE COURT: So aside from th^ hysterical 
feature that you think you noted, the 
inconsistency in sitting posture, and the 
sensory examination in performance of the 
straight-leg examination, everything was the 
same? 
THE WITNESS: Well, no. He Was 
describing some weird features of loss of 
memory and general weakness and various 
tingling sensations, which hadn't been there 
before. And also neck pain, which also 
hadn't been there before. (Emphasis added) 
(T. 1-45-46; App. 3). 
On another occasion, Mr. Onyeabor challenged Dr. Robert 
Cook, a defense psychologist who practices in Denver, on the 
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issue of proper test conditions at an I.M.E. Dr. Cook had 
administered sensitive psychological tests to Mr. Onyeabor at the 
law offices of William Stegall, the defense attorney, to whom Mr. 
Onyeabor was hostile. Mr. Onyeabor desired to impeach Dr. Cook's 
procedure and set the stage for this by asking Dr. Cook: 
Q (Mr. Sykes): All right. The 
conference room, however, is right next to 
the reception area [?]. It is enclosed by 
glass, and you can watch people walk by, 
can't you? 
A (Dr. Cook): Yes. 
Q: And you can hear the phone ring, 
can't you? 
A: Yes. 
(Emphasis added) 
(T. K-194). Mr. Onyeabor's counsel later questioned Dr. Linda 
Gummow, a neuropsychologist, in rebuttal about how this hostile 
test environment could impact the test results. Counsel asked if 
it was proper to administer psychological tests in a conference 
room "that had a glass wall and then it (sic) was a few feet away 
from the reception area." (Emphasis added) (T. M-29:13). In 
response to an objection, the court again sided with the defense 
and made this comment on the evidence: "I don't think he [Dr. 
Cook] said that and don't you put your view as to the distance." 
(Emphasis added) (App. 4). This was an assessment of the 
evidence — and an erroneous one at that — as to how Dr. Cook 
had testified. The memory of the testimony and its evaluation 
was the province of the jury. 
One of the most serious comments on the evidence 
concerned the exhibit notebooks, which were provided for the 
jurors. Judge Dee had ordered that Onyeaborfs counsel could 
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prepare looseleaf notebooks containing the documentary evidence 
on which there would be no objection. The attorneys had agreed 
in advance of trial as to which exhibits wovild be placed in the 
notebooks. Plaintiff attempted to make frequent use of the 
exhibit notebooks from the outset, asking tl^ e jury to refer to 
certain documents that counsel deemed significant for his client. 
On five occasions during the first three days of trialf the court 
made disparaging or negative comments about the use of the 
notebooks (App. 6). Finally, the following exchange occurred 
which was not only tremendously embarrassing to Mr. Onyeabor's 
counsel, but very damaging to his strategy of having the jury 
evaluate certain documents: 
MR. SYKES: May we have the jjury turn to 
that, Your Honor, to 55? 
JUDGE CROFT: Why don't you &sk him the 
question and I think the jury can get it 
easier from what the doctor says ihan they 
can trying to read what the book £ays. And 
all of you follow what the doctor is saying 
at the same time. 
MR. SYKES: Your Honor, the <t>nly reason 
I do that, I think it would be helpful to see 
and hear at the same time. 
JUDGE CROFT: Okay. Let's have an 
understanding that any time the j^ iry wants to 
pick up the book to look at the exhibit that 
the witness is talking about you ftre free to 
do so, if you don't want to you d^n't have 
to. 
MR. SYKES: Okay. I think it would be 
helpful in this case, Your Honor. 
JUDGE CROFT: I'm going to let them make 
the decision because they may not find it 
that way. (Emphasis added) 
(T. D-443-444; App. 6). These interjection^ by the court on the 
use of the exhibit notebooks amounted to a Comment that the 
documentary evidence in the case was not as important as the oral 
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evidence. It also amounted to a negative comment on counsel's 
methods in presenting the case. Both comments were very 
prejudicial. 
There simply is not room to fully discuss every one 
of the court's direct comments on the weight of the evidence, so 
they are cataloged in Table I above. To summarize, the court 
commented that Dr. Linda Gummow was not qualified to render an 
opinion as to whether or not Mr. Onyeabor lost consciousness at 
the scene of the accident because she was not present (App. 5); 
that Dr. Gummow was subject to some discredit because she used 
learned treatises to rebut a prior witness's testimony (App. 7); 
that the judge doubted whether Mr. Onyeabor's vehicle struck the 
center median at the time of the accident, causing him to be 
jostled and to strike his head (App. 8); that an investigating 
officer's experience did not justify his opinion as to whether 
Mr. Onyeabor probably struck his head (App. 9); that certain 
medical terms were too complex for even a medical doctor's 
understanding, so the jury would not comprehend them either (App. 
10); as well as other important matters (Apps. 11-14). These 
comments on the evidence severely prejudiced Mr. Onyeabor. 
" Prejudicial Interjections And Interruptions -
The judge frequently commented on the evidence in the 
form of sua sponte interjections and interruptions (see Table II). 
Some of these were substantively quite serious, while others 
amounted to witness intimidation. They had the general effect 
of casting doubt upon some aspect of Mr. Onyeabor's case. 
One example occurred while counsel was questioning Dr. 
Richard Nielsen, a prominent otolaryngologist, about Mr. 
TABLE II 
INTERJECTIONS AND INTERRUPTIONS (SUA SPONTE)* BY TRIAL COURT 
| Very Serious Interruptions tl 
App. Day of Witness Name/ Transcript 
No. Trial/Date Called By Vol./Page Substance and Effect of Interjection or Interruption 
15. 3 - 2/04 Richard Nielsen D 460 
M.D. (P) 
16. 6 - 2/09 Mark Zelig, 
Ph.D. (P) 
G 95-96 
Judge invites opposition to object to expert's qualifications; casts doubt 
upon expert's qualifications. 
Judge interjects comment to help defense; scolds plaintiff's expert witness; 
one of few instances in trial where judge interjected during defense exami-
nation . 
17. 8 - 2/11 Alan Heal (P) J 187 
18. 6 - 2/09 Mark Zelig, 
Ph.D. (P) 
G 66-67 
Judge interjects to help defense; questions plaintiff's expert on basis of 
opinion. 
Judge interjects and tells jury that the doctor is "broadening his answer 
... too much." 
19. 9 - 2/12 Boyd Fjeldsted K 9 
(P) 
Rude interjection which implies that plaintiff's counsel has suggested an 
answer. 
20. 8 - 2/11 Alan Heal (P) J 196 
21. 8 
22. 
23. 9 -
2/11 
2/04 
2/12 
David Nilsson 
Ph.D. (P) 
Gerald Moress, 
M.D. (P) 
Robert Cook, 
Ph.D. (D) 
J 
D 
K 
63 
422 
209 
24. 4 - 2/05 Richard Goka, E 497 
M.D. (P) 
Rude and unnecessary interjection which suggests that plaintiff's expert 
has not answered a question posed by defense counsel. 
Rude interruption during plaintiff's examination of expert suggesting that 
expert has exceeded his expertise. 
Interjects to question expert witness about where plaintiff hit his head. 
Court interjects to help defense witness on re-cross as to what was said 
earlier. 
1 Serious Interruptions 1 
Questions plaintiff's expert as to whether he understands certain head 
injury terms from a glossary. 
* Raised by the court without defense counsel objections. t Other serious interjections are cataloged in Table I, 
Tab Nos. 3, 5, 6, and 11. 
TABLE II CONTINUED 
App. Day of Witness Name/ Transcript 
No. Trial/Date Called By Vol./Page Substance and Effect of Interjection or Interruption 
25. 8 - 2/11 David Nilsson, J 38 
Ph.D. (P) 
26. 5 - 2/06 Duncan Wallace, F 744-5 
M.D. (P) 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
8 
6 
11 
3 
- 2/11 
- 2/09 
- 2/17 
- 2/04 
David Nilsson, 
Ph.D. (P) 
Mark Zelig, 
Ph.D. (P) 
Emmanuel 
Onyeabor (P) 
Richard Goka, 
M.D. (P) 
J 
G 
M 
D 
9 
9 
6 
4 
31. 7 - 2/10 Emmanuel I 103 
Onyeabor (P) 
32. 3 - 2/04 Stevens D 311-12 
Pedersen (P) 
33. 3 - 2/04 
34. 3 - 2/04 
35. Many/ 
Various 
Richard Goka, D 476-7 
M.D. (P) 
Richard Nielson D 456 
M.D. (P) 
Patrick Chukwu Many 
Mr. Onyeabor 
Pamela Walker, MA 
Stevens Pedersen 
Richard Goka, M.D. 
Linda Gummow, Ph.D. 
Mark Zelig, Ph.D. (P) 
Questions plaintiff's expert about something that "troubled me" regarding 
scope of jury's decision to decide the case. 
Judge interjects to unnecessarily restrict plaintiff's re-direct examina-
nation on expert witness's own drop in IQ after expert's gas poisoning head 
injury; defense counsel had earlier raised the issue of expert's own injury 
on cross-examination to impeach expert's objectivity. 
Interjects in attempt to narrow scope of answer by plaintiff's expert. 
Interrupts to help defense counsel's examination on issue of grades. 
Interrupts plaintiff's answer to important question. 
Interjects to try to narrow scope of witness's expertise. 
1 Unnecessary and Disruptive Interjections [ 
Price of left-front tire repair offered to show that plaintiff did in fact 
hit the median strip and was severely jostled; witness hassled by judge. 
Didn't want plaintiff's father-in-law to testify about the fact that he was 
hard of hearing; offered to lay foundation that plaintiff's wife would 
notice hearing problems in plaintiff caused by the accident. 
Interrupted to get evidence admitted before plaintiff's counsel had 
finished laying foundation. 
Unnecessary scolding of counsel on evidentary matter. 
Many rude, unnecessary, annoying interruptions and interjections that 
amounted to witness intimidation. 
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Onyeabor's neurosensory hearing loss. Dr. Nielsen was asked as 
to the percentage of permanent partial impairment resulting from 
that aspect of the injuries. He responded that there was a one 
to two percent impairment, at which point Jildge Croft interjected 
sua sponte with the following: 
Q (Mr. Sykes): One or two percent 
[referring to permanent hearing impairment]? 
A (Dr. Nielsen): Yes, that's -- I feel 
that's rather an artificial way to measure 
hearing loss, but that's the way it's 
commonly used in disability. 
JUDGE CROFT: I assume, Mr. Stegall, you 
are not objecting to lack of qualification 
testimony? 
MR. STEGALL: Your Honor, I understand 
the gentleman is an ENT specialist and — 
JUDGE CROFT: You stipulate l^e is an 
expert in that field? 
MR. STEGALL: In the field. 
JUDGE CROFT: And can testify without 
further foundation? (Emphasis added) 
(T. D-460:9-17; App. 15). A juror could not} fail to miss the 
fact that the judge was attacking the credibility of Dr. 
Nielsen's testimony by questioning his qualifications as an 
expert. 
The court frequently interjected Comments during the 
questioning of plaintiff's experts which inferred that the expert 
did not answer the question fully (Apps. 16, 17, 18, 20, and 21). 
The effect of these comments certainly gave the jury the 
impression that the expert was being less tHan candid. Another 
impact of the sua sponte interruptions (Appq. 15-23) was to 
suggest that Mr. Onyeabor's experts either did not answer 
questions substantively, or had said too much and needed to be 
interrupted. Every such instance related tq something of 
23 
substance about the case, such as whether Mr. Onyeabor struck his 
head (App. 22); to what extent it is appropriate to rely on 
experts from different fields (App. 20); or how a discount rate 
is derived (App. 19). 
There were additionally seven other serious 
interruptions (Apps. 24-30). For example, the court questioned 
whether or not Dr. Goka understood certain medical terms (App. 
24); the court indicated that it was "troubled" by something that 
it thought Dr. Nielsen said (App. 25); and the court emphasized 
particular negative points brought up in the testimony (App. 9). 
The net impact of this series of interjections was to impute 
weakness to certain evidence presented by Mr. Onyeabor (see Table 
II for a summary). 
Lastly, the court simply interrupted witnesses time and 
time again, making it difficult to examine and cross-examine 
them, and in effect harassing them (App. 31-35). These actions 
by the judge were unnecessary and intimidating to the witnesses. 
The court in Egede-Nissen, supra, noted that judicial 
interruptions can suggest lack of judicial confidence in the 
integrity of witnesses: 
The court, of course, may question witnesses. , 
However, the court's questions may not be 
phrased in a manner indicative of the court's 
attitude toward the merits of the cause, thus 
constituting an impermissible comment on the 
evidence. 
Id. at 1222. These repeated interjections by the court 
certainly must have indicated to the jurors the court's feelings 
on the merits. 
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The Court generally interfered with counsel's 
cross-examination, which severely disrupted Mr. Onyeabor's 
presentation of the case. In addition to tfye examples discussed 
above, the following are relevant: 
The court refused to allow counsel to write down on the 
board ^ hat a defease witness had ignored in forcing his opinion 
(T. K-54-5); interfered with the cross-examination of a defense 
psychologist by the use of a chart (T. K-ll$-117); refused to 
allow counsel to write down on the board a score used in a test 
that Mr. Onyeabor had taken with that psychologist (T. K-167-8); 
interrupted counsel in the middle of a question and before the 
answer (T. L-46); interjected harshly in th^ examination of Mr. 
Onyeabor's psychologist with respect to an exhibit the court 
thought had not been admitted (T. N-12) which should have been 
admitted (T. K-153); and interfered with the drawing of a diagram 
during the psychologist's rebuttal testimony (T. N-14). 
A court has wide discretion in controlling the conduct 
of a trial. However, unnecessarily harsh treatment of counsel 
constitutes a comment on the evidence. Messier v. Simmons Gun 
Specialists, Inc., 687 P.2d 121 (Okla. 1984). The Court noted: 
However, as long as counsel is not unduly 
restricted, his knowledge challenged, or his 
motives impugned, the court may direct 
counsel to refrain from delay and may comment 
on a waste of time. 
Id. at 129. Thus, even if some of the interjections made by the 
court could be deemed to be made in the interests of conserving 
time, the manner in which they were done certainly impugned the 
motives and knowledge of Onyeabor's counsel in such a way as to 
reflect prejudicially upon his case. 
" Arguments In Front Of The Jury -
The court permitted extensive arguments as to evidence 
in front of the jury. This amounted to a comment on the evidence 
because it indicated that the court believed plaintiff's evidence 
to be weak or unconvincing. 
Normally, such argumentation and disputes about 
evidence would have occurred outside the presence of the jury, at 
least in a side bar conference. However, the court refused all 
three of Mr. Onyeabor's requests to approach the bench (T. B-46, 
C-76, 1-103). This effectively intimidated counsel from making 
further requests to approach the bench. The only time that the 
court allowed counsel to approach the bench was when defense 
counsel, Mr. Stegall, asked permission (T. L-190). 
As a result of the refusal of the court to allow 
counsel to approach the bench, counsel conducted frequent 
and lengthy interchanges with the court on the admissibility of 
evidence in front of the jury. Defense counsel frequently 
interjected prejudicial information. This constituted a comment 
on the evidence because the court allowed it to happen. For 
example, the judge frequently allowed argument over the proper 
use of learned treatises (T. E-560-564; F-842; H-20-23; M-32-36; 
and M-49-54). The court allowed argumentation on the 
admissibility of certain exhibits, including Exhibit 112, a film 
regarding head injury in general (T. E-498-499); Exhibit 11, a 
photo album (T. G-137); and the admissibility of evidence on 
medical bills (T. J-140-142). 
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The court allowed argumentation about other important 
evidentiary points such as the viability of Dr. Gummow's 
disability evaluation (T. F-856-857); whether or not Liz Onyeabor 
would be allowed to testify on the issue of Mr. Onyeabor!s grades 
and why he took certain classes twice (T. J-132-135); whether Liz 
Onyeabor would be allowed to testify as to what Mr. Onyeaborfs 
employment and school plans were for the future if there had been 
no accident (T. J-143); and what rate the economist Boyd 
Fjeldsted should be allowed to use in figuring Mr. Onyeaborfs 
loss of future earning capacity (T. K-18-22)|. 
This argumentation was harmful to Mr. Onyeabor•s case 
because the judge invariably ended the dispute by ruling against 
Mr. Onyeaborfs position. However, there were no other options 
open. Counsel could not approach the bench, and the only other 
avenue was to let the erroneous rulings slide by without any 
attempt to correct them. The overall impact of the court's 
refusal to allow counsel to approach the bench and permitting 
extensive argumentation in front of the jury was to prejudice Mr. 
Onyeabor's case because of comments on the evidence. 
- The Demeanor Of The Court Prejudiced The Jury -
The trial judge exhibited harshness and a hostile 
demeanor toward the plaintiff's case and counsel throughout the 
trial. This prejudicial demeanor was very significant, but does 
not display well in the printed record because it included facial 
expressions, tone of voice, sighs and body language. Therefore, 
counsel has procured affidavits from some oi: the doctors and 
other witnesses who were present at the trial and who witnessed 
27 
these events. Such allegations are properly shown by affidavit. 
Egede-Nissen, supra at 1222. These affidavits are contained in 
Appendices 36-39. 
The court was particularly harsh with plaintiff's 
counsel during the first three days of trial, frowning 
frequently, sighing and demonstrating by "body language" that the 
court did not think much of Mr. Onyeabor's case or his counsel 
(Apps. 36, 37, 38, and 39). For example, Dr. Brian Burns, a 
chiropractor who has testified over 30 times, stated that he had 
never seen "even one judge be so discourteous ... or hostile 
towards the plaintiff's counsel." (App. 37). Dr. Linda Gummow, 
a neuropsychologist who treated Mr. Onyeabor, stated in her 
affidavit that not only did the judge's tone of voice, facial 
expressions, frowning, and general attitude demonstrate a 
definite bias against the plaintiff, but that his comments 
demonstrated a definite hostility toward her personally (App. 36). 
Robert Jinks, an experienced trial attorney in California and 
Hawaii, noted "facial expressions of disgust and dissatisfaction, 
including grunts and sighs that were related to plaintiff's 
evidence of expert witnesses and exhibits" (App. 38). Mr. Jinks 
noted that he had never seen a case "where the judge was so 
obviously and blatantly biased against one party" (App. 38, ?3). 
Kay Nebeker made similar, articulate comments about the court's 
obvious bias (App. 39). 
When overruling Mr. Onyeabor's objections, the court 
used a very harsh and gruff voice. He appeared to lack patience 
with everything requested by plaintiff's counsel. A good example 
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of this, which does appear in the record in partr can be seen in 
the incident having to do with the exhibit notebooks provided to 
the jurors (see discussion above; see also App. 6; T. D-443-444). 
When Mr. Onyeabor's counsel tried to use the notebooks, the court 
gave noticeable shrugs of the shoulders and "snapped" at counsel, 
making comments about what he obviously regarded as a laborious 
process (T. D-325, 333, 348, and 382). 
Mr. Onyeabor's counsel did object to the judge's 
comments on the evidence in front of the jury after the third day 
of trial, although it will not appear directly in the record. At 
the end of the third day of trial, counsel met with the court 
in chambers, and "had it out" on the issues described above. The 
reporter had gone home, so it won't be found on the record; 
however, there are indications in the record, as well as an 
admission by the court, that the incident did occur. See the 
reference to this issue in plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for a New Trial (R. 694-695), and th6 court's 
acknowledgment of the incident in the course of its ruling on the 
Motion for a New Trial (T. P-87:18). 
The meeting between counsel and the court referred to 
in the record lasted approximately 30 to 40 minutes, was quite 
animated and covered the comments on the evidence extensively. 
The conference occurred on the evening of the third day of trial, 
February 4, 1987. The next day, Thursday, February 5, 1987, was 
better. The court indicated that the jurors could now look at 
the notebooks if requested by counsel (App. 6, last page; T. 
E-491). However, the comments on the evidence and interjections 
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into the record continued relatively unabated, even increasing 
the second week of trial. 
Obviously, Mr. Onyeabor's counsel was reluctant to 
object every time the court commented on the evidence. It would 
have resulted in a spate of continuous objections, as can be seen 
from Tables I and II. The Egede-Nissen court said: 
While the report of proceedings does not 
reflect contemporaneous objections to such 
conduct [i.e., the judge's "body language" 
indicating disbelief during the testimony], 
concurrent objection is not required. 
Understandably, counsel may be reluctant to 
note such an objection, particularly in the 
presence of the jury, and may elect not to 
object at all if the incidents were only 
occasional and minor. If, however, the 
occurrences were ... frequent and marked ... 
counsel should object to the court's conduct. 
(Emphasis added) 
Id. at 1223. It would simply have been futile to have continued 
objecting. 
- Cumulative Effect Of Comments -
The comments on the evidence and interjections into the 
record in this case were many, varied and pervasive. Although 
some of the errors and comments were very serious, many would not 
have been grounds for reversal standing alone. Viewed from a 
cumulative perspective, however, these errors were devastating. 
The Egede-Nissen court said: 
A trial judge should not enter into the "fray 
of combat" nor assume the role of counsel. 
An isolated instance of such conduct may be 
deemed harmless error, however, if it cannot 
be said to violate constitutional bounds of 
judicial comment. ... On the other hand, the 
cumulative effect of repeated interjections 
by the court may constitute reversible error. 
In the instant case, we believe the trial 
court, perhaps inadvertently without meaning 
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to do so, actively interceded in tthe trial 
more frequently and at greater length than 
the circumstances warranted ... . (Emphasis 
added) 
Id. at 1223. The judge in Onyeabor actively interceded far more 
than he needed tof even if some of the instances may have been 
justified. 
The effect on the jury of the judge's actions should 
not be underestimated. One court characterized it in this 
manner: 
Every lawyer who has ever tried a case, and 
every judge who has ever presided at a trial, 
knows that the jurors are inclined to regard 
the lawyers engaged in the trial as 
partisans, and are quick to attend an 
interruption by the judge, to which they may 
attach an importance and a meaning in no way 
intended. It is the working of human nature 
of which all men who have had any experience 
in the trial of cases may take notice. 
Between the contrary winds of advocacy, a 
juror would not be a man if he did not, in 
some of the distractions of mind which attend 
a hard-fought and doubtful case, grasp the 
words and manner of the judge as a guide to 
lead him out of his perplexity. On the other 
hand, a presiding judge has no way to measure 
the effect of his interruption. The very 
fact that he takes a witness away from the 
attorney for examination may, in the tense 
atmosphere of a trial, lead to great 
prejudice. (Emphasis added) 
State v. Jackson, 145 P. 470 (Wash. 1915), quoted with approval 
in Risley v. Moberq, 419 P.2d 151 (Wash. 1966). In the 
hard-fought case pressed by Mr. Onyeabor in the lower court, the 
cumulative effect of the comments on the evidence and judicial 
interjections was devastating to Mr. Onyeaborfs chances of 
receiving a fair trial. He did not receive a fair trial. 
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POINT II. 
Dr. Clark - A Surprise Witness 
ALLOWING DR. LINCOLN CLARK, A DEFENSE PSYCHIATRIST, TO 
TESTIFY AT TRIAL WAS PREJUDICIAL SURPRISE BECAUSE HE 
WAS NOT NOTICED AS A WITNESS UNTIL SIX BUSINESS DAYS 
BEFORE TRIAL, THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT FURNISHED A COPY 
OF HIS REPORT UNTIL THE THIRD DAY OF TRIAL AND THE 
REPORT WAS INCOMPLETE. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
AND 
APPLICABLE RULES OF LAW 
Rule 26(e)(1) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as 
follows: 
A party is under a duty seasonably to 
supplement his response with respect to any 
question directly addressed to ... the 
identity of each person expected to be called 
as an expert witness at trial, the subject 
matter on which he is expected to testify, 
and the substance of his testimony. 
(Emphasis added) 
Rule 51(a)(3) provides that a new trial may be granted on the 
basis of "accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not 
have guarded against." 
A defendant's calling of a medical doctor to testify 
about the cause of a plaintiff's injury does not constitute 
surprise where the plaintiff has notice of the specific witness 
and subject matter of the testimony. Jensen v. Thomas, 570 P.2d 
695 (Utah 1977) (where an earlier answer to an interrogatory by 
defendant had stated the substance of a specific doctor's 
testimony about a certain disease). However, the court should 
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exclude a defense medical expert where the name and/or subject 
matter of the testimony is not disclosed in a timely manner. 
Acosta v. Superior Court, 706 P.2d 763 (Ariz. App. 1985); Hadid 
v. Alexander, 462 A.2d 1216 (Md. App. 1983); Lodrique v. 
Houma-Terrebonne Airport Com'n, 450 So.2d 1004 (La. App. 1984); 
and Sturdivant v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 476 A.2d 1074 (Conn. App. 
1984). Exclusion of the witness is further justified where no 
report or a late report is prepared, or where the report does not 
disclose important information. Otherwise, cross-examination is 
hindered. Hoover v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 611 F.2d 1132 (5th 
Cir. 1980); Sirianni v. General Motors Corp., 325 F.Supp. 509 
(W.D. Pa. 1971); DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 433 
F.Supp. 1047 (E.D. Pa. 1977). 
The trial court abuses its discretion if it denies a 
Rule 59(a)(3) motion for a new trial where there is a surprise 
"which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against." 
Jensen, supra; see also Anderson v. Bradley, 590 P.2d 339, 341 
(Utah 1979). The surprise contemplated by Rule 59(a) must result 
from some adverse circumstance or situation in which a party is 
placed unexpectedly to his injury, and without any fault or 
negligence of his own. Havas v. Haupt, 583 P.2d 1094, 1095 (Nev. 
1978). 
ARGUMENT 
I • , . „ I 
- Introduction -
The facts regarding Dr. Clark's reappearance in this 
case are egregious. As of December 5, 1986, Dr. Clark was 
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unequivocally out of the case, claiming Mr. Onyeabor was 
frightening to him, and stating "I have already expressed I want 
out of this. I mean I made that very clear at the beginning." 
(Emphasis added) (T. S-18). He stated, "I'm not going to change 
my mind" (Emphasis added) (T. S-19). Dr. Clark's withdrawal from 
the case was the reason for continuing the trial from December 8, 
1986, to February 2, 1987. No amount of "ordinary prudence" 
could have warned Mr. Onyeabor's counsel that Dr. Clark would 
reappear under these circumstances. 
The defendants had a continuing duty to supplement 
their responses to interrogatories wherein the names of all 
witnesses were requested. Rule 26(e)(1), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Plaintiff asked for the names of all witnesses in the 
interrogatories answered on July 21, 1986 (App. 44). The notice 
of Dr. Clark as a witness, after his "final" withdrawal on 
December 5, 1986, came by way of the defense supplementary 
witness list served by mail on January 21, 1987 (R. 308). On 
January 30, 1987, Plaintiff made a timely Motion in Limine to 
prohibit Dr. Clark from testifying, which was denied by the court 
(R. 326; T. Q-54). 
- Prejudice To Mr. Onyeabor -
The court committed reversible error in not excluding 
Dr. Clark's testimony. His disclosure as a witness was not made 
known to Mr. Onyeabor until six business days prior to trial, and 
there was simply not time enough, given the exigency of 
preparation for a major trial and the unavailability of defense 
counsel, to take Dr. Clark's deposition (see Statement of Facts 
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above). It should be noted that counsel operated throughout this 
entire case under an agreement of open discovery, i.e., 
depositions of all experts on both sides. There were 10 to 15 
depositions of expert witnesses conducted by the parties. Had 
there been time and meaningful opportunity, Mr. Onyeabor would 
have taken Dr. Clark's deposition. 
Almost all courts refuse to allow last minute experts 
to testify, under circumstances similar to those in Onyeabor. In 
Lodrigue v. Houma-Terrebonne Airport Com'n, supra, the defendants 
in a personal injury suit had submitted an interrogatory to the 
plaintiff asking for the names of any expert witnesses that 
plaintiff intended to call. A trial was scheduled for September 
16, 1982, and the plaintiff supplemented his responses on 
September 7, 1982, nine days before trial, submitting the name of 
an expert witness and then was uncooperative to defendant's 
request to depose the witness prior to trial. The appellate 
court in Lodrigue noted Louisiana's equivalent to Utah Rule 
26(e)(1) which required a party to "seasonably" supplement 
responses to interrogatories. The trial court refused to allow 
the witness to testify and was upheld on appeal because the 
defendants were prejudiced in their discovery efforts. Jd. at 
1007. 
The policy reasons for forbidding a last minute expert 
to testify where the untimeliness of notice is unexplained are 
well set out in the case of Acosta v. Superior Court, supra, 
which has amazing parallels to Onyeabor. In Acosta, the 
plaintiff was a petitioner in a wrongful death malpractice action 
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scheduled for trial on September 4, 1985. The real party in 
interest was an anesthesiologist. The defense list of witnesses 
did not include a certain doctor. Two days after the deadline 
for filing notice of witnesses, and 18 days prior to the trial 
date, defense counsel apparently received a letter from a doctor 
containing his opinion as to the cause of death. The defense 
counsel notified the plaintiff's counsel that the doctor would be 
a witness but did not furnish a report until 13 days later, or 
five days before trial. The witness in question was unavailable 
for deposition until trial. The trial judge indicated his 
intention to allow the witness to testify, and the plaintiff 
brought a special action appealing the trial court's refusal to 
strike the expert witness. The appellate court held that the 
trial court had abused its discretion, and vacated the order 
allowing testimony by the witness. The appellate court stated 
that preclusion of a witness: 
... should only be invoked where there is 
both absence of good cause for the 
untimeliness and prejudice to the opposing 
party. Both conditions are met on the facts 
of this case. Counsel for the [defendants] 
has suggested no reason for the late 
revelation of the witness save failure of his 
clients to discover him until the eve of 
trial. This is not good cause; dilatoriness 
never is. Beyond this, no reason was 
advanced for withholding the content of the 
witness1 testimony for an additional two 
weeks. (Emphasis added). 
Id. at 764. The Court noted the prejudice that would result to 
the plaintiff, who had obtained a special visa to come to testify 
from Mexico. The Court observed that if the trial date were 
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changed to permit additional discovery, that effort on the part 
of the plaintiff would be lost. There was additional prejudice: 
[A] fixed trial date is a valuable asset. 
Once lost, substantial delay of up to a year 
could result. Finally, there is prejudice to 
the administration of justice where trials 
are delayed; courts cannot effectively 
function if their calendars are subject to 
the control of dilatory parties. 
Id. at 765. 
In the Onyeabor case, a fourth continuance of the trial 
was not possible due to the precarious condition of Mr. 
Onyeabor's mental health. At the November 10, 1986, hearing on 
the third defense Motion for Continuance (of the November 17th 
trial date), Linda Gummow, Mr. Onyeabor's treating psychologist, 
testified in opposition to a continuance. She had previously 
filed a report detailing the harm that Mr. Onyeabor had suffered 
as a result of the previous continuance (R. 200). She indicated 
that Mr. Onyeabor's psychological condition had deteriorated 
considerably because of previous continuances (T. R-10-11). Dr. 
Duncan Wallace, Mr. Onyeabor's psychiatrist, also told a 
frightening story of Mr. Onyeabor's serious loss of emotional 
control resulting from the November continuance (T. E-699-702). 
Mr. Onyeabor was simply "on the edge" mentally and emotionally, 
and a number of people thought he would be a danger to himself 
and others (R. 201) if yet a fourth continuance were to be 
granted (T. S-2-3). 
- No Explanation of Untimeliness -
The defendants never presented any reasonable 
explanation as to the untimeliness of their notification of Dr. 
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Clark's reappearance or their failure to present a timely written 
report to the plaintiff as required by Rule 35, U.R.C.P., until 
the third day of trial. At the hearing on the Motion in Limine, 
Mr. Stegall merely indicated the following: 
In the first part of January Dr. Clark 
contacted me and indicated that he was 
concerned about being out of the case. ... 
For that reason I have shown him as a 
witness. (Emphasis added) 
(T. Q-38-39). If Mr. Stegall was aware of Dr. Clark's 
reappearance in the "first part of January", why wasn't counsel 
notified until January 21st? Furthermore, why did he wait until 
February 4th, the third day of trial, to provide a written report 
(App. 41) as required by Rules 35 and 26(e)(1), U.R.C.P.? There 
has been no explanation of either delay. 
The failure to provide notice of Dr. Clark is puzzling. 
First of all, Dr. Clark's own testimony was suspicious. He was 
asked directly and pointedly when he decided to re-enter the case 
and he simply evaded the question, finally giving a vague answer: 
Q (Mr. Sykes): When did you do that 
[offer to re-enter the case]? 
A (Dr. Clark): I have forgotten the 
exact date when that occurred? 
Q. Early in January, late in December? 
A. I think that Mr. Stegall would have 
to answer that. 
Q. I am asking you. 
A. I do not have a record of that, when 
it was exactly. 
Q. Well do you — it has only been two 
months. Do you recall approximately, was it 
before or after Christmas? 
A. Well, I think it was after Christmas, 
but I am not certain of that. (Emphasis 
added) 
(T. L-127-128). 
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There was plenty of opportunity to provide notice of 
Dr. Clark's re-entry as an expert witness. Both counsel were in 
frequent telephone contact during December, 1986, and January of 
1987. There are at least three separate pieces of written 
correspondence from Mr. Stegall to Mr. Sykes during that period 
(App. 40); yet, on none of these occasions was counsel made aware 
that Dr. Clark had re-entered the case, allegedly in "early 
January." All of the correspondence, as well as oral 
conversations with counsel up until that time, indicated that Dr. 
Cook of Denver was the only contemplated defense expert witness 
(App. 40), and trial preparation was done accordingly. 
- Failure To Provide A Timely, Complete Report -
In Sirianni v. General Motors Corp., supra, the trial 
judge excluded the testimony of a physician where the plaintiff 
presented no pre-trial report to the defense. The court regarded 
the testimony of the doctor as that of a "new medical witness" 
even though the doctor had treated the plaintiff three years 
prior to the trial. The Court held: 
The exclusion of such testimony without a 
prior report is a well-standing practice in 
this court under our pre-trial rules in 
support of a strong policy against the 
introduction of surprise testimony of expert 
opinion witnesses. 
Id. at 511 
The failure to produce a report from Dr. Clark until 
the third day of trial was highly prejudicial. The report was 
seven single-spaced pages (App. 41), and was handed to Mr. 
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Onyeabor's counsel on the morning of February 4thf the third day 
of trial. Later that same day, Mr. Onyeabor began calling his 
expert witnesses on the head injury issue (Drs. Moress, Nielsen 
and Goka — see Vol. D of transcript), and had called virtually 
all of these witnesses by the close of trial on Friday, February 
6th. Thus, none of plaintiff's witnesses really had an 
opportunity to read and assess Dr. Clark's report prior to the 
time they testified. Counsel did not have time to analyze the 
report and discuss it with his experts, because of the hectic 
nature of daily trial preparation in a major case. 
Dr. Clark's late report presented an additional 
significant problem. It did not state a conclusion as to what 
was wrong with Mr. Onyeabor (App. 41:7). It indicated that his 
native abilities were more limited than those of his siblings, 
but that he was "... a man of average general ability" who simply 
needed to redirect his career goals (App. 41:7). There was 
simply no adverse diagnosis or clue as to what his opinion really 
was on several important issues having to do with brain injury. 
However, on cross-examination it turned out that Dr. Clark did 
not believe that there could be a closed-head organic brain 
injury in someone like Mr. Onyeabor unless there was loss of 
consciousness, retrograde amnesia and positive findings on tests 
such as the CT scan, the EEG, etc. (T. L-180:5, 24; 184:1-3; 
185-6). Therefore, counsel was compelled to hastily cross-
examine Dr. Clark on these issues based upon reference to learned 
texts (T. L-172-192). The doctor refused to acknowledge many of 
the texts and the authors as authoritative (T. L-175:14), so the 
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cross-examination was not as effective as it could have been had 
counsel been able to learn the doctor's opinions in a prior 
deposition and what texts he regarded as authoritative. 
One of the most damaging aspects of Dr. Clark's 
testimony was the diagnosis that Dr. Clark gave of Mr. Onyeabor 
for the first time on cross-examination. Dr. Clark was 
questioned by plaintiff's counsel as to why there had been no 
diagnosis in the report. At that point, Dr. Clark diagnosed Mr. 
Onyeabor's problems as a pre-existing personality disorder. He 
stated: 
I could do that readily. I think it is 
self-evident in terms of it being a 
personality disorder with histrionic 
features, and also explosive features as well. 
And his hysteroid, it is a personality 
disorder, other mixed type with histrionic, 
and I agree, an explosive feature as well. 
(Emphasis added) (Note: The actual 
testimony was far more lucid; this passage 
reflects some confusion by the reporter.) 
(T. L-192:15). Since the doctor brought that up, counsel was 
forced to cross-examine on the issue (T. L-193-199). This gave 
Dr. Clark an additional opportunity to expound on Mr. Onyeabor's 
allegedly pre-existing personality disorder (T. L-193-4). This 
would not have happened had Mr. Onyeabor's counsel had the prior 
opportunity to learn the details of Dr. Clark's opinion in a 
complete report. 
Counsel's "rock and a hard place" situation in this 
case is exactly what the rules of discovery were designed to 
prevent. Counsel was placed in the unenviable position of having 
to either request a continuance and risk further damage to the 
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client; take time out in the middle of a trial and try to prepare 
a deposition of Dr. Clark at great disadvantage because of timing 
and a very late report; or proceed with the trial examination and 
do the best one could with the limited information available. 
A continuance was out of the question because of the 
client's mental health (see discussion above). A mid-trial 
deposition of a difficult, hostile expert witness was was 
impractical. It would have required significant preparation and 
concentration to take a meaningful deposition of this particular 
witness at this time. To conduct a major trial requires all of 
the energies of an attorney while in attendance at court during 
the day, and in evaluation and preparation at night. There is no 
time left for the arduous task of preparing for and taking the 
deposition of a difficult expert witness. Dr. Clark is a 
well-known, oft-used "defense psychiatrist" who has been asked to 
be a witness by defense counsel many times during the past 
several years (T. L-115:17-21; 115-116). The way that Dr. Clark 
answered — or didn't answer — the question of how many times he 
had been a witness (T. L-116-118) is evidence of his skill as a 
"a street-wise" defense witness. 
If Dr. Clark had been a simple fact witness, the 
situation would have been different. A mid-trial deposition 
would have been simple. However, in the context of an 
emotionally draining, time-consuming, 18-hour-a-day case such as 
this, the possibility of taking a major deposition of an 
important expert was an impossible task. Counsel therefore was 
required to pursue the course of the lesser evil, that of 
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cross-examining Dr. Clark on the witness st^nd and hoping for the 
best. 
Courts generally refused to allow surprise experts 
to testify in similar situations. For example, in Hoover v. U.S. 
Dept. of Interior, supra, the Court held that an opposing party 
is entitled to discover the substance of the facts and the 
opinions of the expected testimony. "The primary purpose of this 
required disclosure is to permit the opposing party to prepare an 
effective cross-examination." (Emphasis added) _Id. at 1142. An 
"effective cross-examination" is precisely what was denied 
plaintiff with respect to Dr. Clark. In the case of DeMarines v. 
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, supra, the defendant in an airline 
decompression case called a doctor of whom no prior notice was 
given, to testify that the plaintiff's condition resulted from 
pre-existing causes (similar to Dr. Clark's testimony in this 
case). The plaintiff's counsel objected to this improper 
testimony on the grounds that the report furnished to him by the 
doctor did not contain any such diagnosis. The trial judge 
excluded the testimony ruling: 
T am not going to permit that testimony if 
there is not something [about the problem] 
in this report because, frankly, the very 
reason for handing over reports is so that 
both sides will be aware of what is going on 
and not be sprung any surprises. (Emphasis 
added) 
Id. at 1058. The Court also noted the importance that all 
parties be informed "before trial as to the substance of the 
other party's expert testimony in order that he may be prepared 
to meet this testimony and will not be surprised by it. " Id., at 
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1059. The appellate court, therefore, found no prejudicial error 
in excluding the doctor's testimony. Accord, Hadid v. Alexander, 
supra; Sturdivant v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., supra (the Court 
correctly refused to allow a party's medical expert to testify 
where the party had claimed that although the medical expert had 
been informally consulted previously, he had not been formally 
retained until the day after the jury selection began; the Court 
characterized this conduct as "tactical subterfuge," which 
justified the sanction). 
Hopefully Mrs. Bates will finally provide an 
explanation in her brief as to why notice of Dr. Clark and a 
report were not provided sooner. Regardless of the reason, 
however, the prejudice to Mr. Onyeabor is undeniable, and 
warrants reversal and remand for a new trial. 
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POINT III. 
Erroneous Evidentiary Rulings 
THE COURT WRONGFULLY EXCLUDED IMPORTANT EVIDENCE WHICH 
AFFECTED THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
AND 
APPLICABLE RULES OF LAW 
The admission of legally inadmissible evidence is error 
and presumed prejudicial. Boy v. I.T.T. Grinnell Corp., 724 P.2d 
612, 618 (Ariz.App. 1986). The erroneous exclusion of evidence 
is grounds for reversal if it appears that the excluded evidence 
would have had a substantial influence in bringing about a 
different verdict or finding. Hill v. Hartog, 658 P.2d 1206 
(Utah 1983). A stricter standard of review is justified when the 
erroneous rulings on evidence occurred in a jury trial. Arnovitz 
v. Telia, 27 Utah 2d 261, 495 P.2d 310 (1972). If the error is 
substantial enough that it is reasonable to believe that it 
adversely affected the appellant or deprived him of a fair trial, 
and in the absence of the error there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the outcome would have been different, reversal is warranted. 
Del Porto v. Nicolo, supra; Matter of Kessler, supra. 
The improper exclusion of an expert in accident 
reconstruction as to any relevant matter within the scope of that 
expert's knowledge, justifies the granting of a new trial. 
Reeves v. Markle, 579 P.2d 1382 (Ariz. 1978). An expert witness 
may be cross-examined regarding a medical textbook. A medical 
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treatise can also be used on direct and re-direct examination. 
Purcell v. Zimbelman, 500 P.2d 335 (Ariz.App. 1972). Failure to 
allow a proper rebuttal witness is prejudicial error. Hall v. 
Hall, 708 P.2d 416 (Wyo. 1985). 
Prejudicial error should be presumed when admissible 
evidence is excluded. Dawson v. Associates Financial Service Co. 
of Kansas, Inc., 529 P.2d 104 (Kan. 1974). 
ARGUMENT 
The court wrongfully excluded a great deal of important 
evidence offered by plaintiff. A few of the most important 
points will be discussed at some length; the balance are referred 
to in summary fashion. 
A. Exhibit 114f video tape of crash. The court 
excluded plaintiff's Exhibit 114, a video tape of a dummy in a 
car striking a wall at 5 mph and 21 mph (T. C-146). Plaintiff 
had laid the foundation for this exhibit through Dennis Andrews, 
a former highway patrolman and an accident reconstruction expert 
with Rudi Limpertfs firm (T. C-122-128). Mr. Andrews testified 
that Mr. Onyeabor's vehicle was going approximately 35 mph at 
impact (T. C-105-106) whereas the Bates1 vehicle was going 
approximately 5 mph in a northerly direction at impact (T. C-108). 
Mr. Andrews then explained the principles of relative motion that 
apply to bodies in a car at the time of a sudden, deceleration 
accident. Mr. Andrews testified that the exhibit illustrated 
this principle, despite the fact that it dealt with a wall crash 
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rather than two vehicles in motion, because the principle 
illustrated in both cases was sudden deceleration (T. C-125-126). 
Mr. Andrews indicated that whether someone hit a wall, or another 
significantly slower moving object, the principle of sudden 
deceleration and what it would do to a body in the car were the 
same (T. C-124-125; C-126:3-21). 
The rejected video tape demonstrates graphically what 
happened to the body of a dummy even in a 5 mph crash. The 
dummy's head made an approximate nine-inch bulls-eye pattern in 
the windshield. The video tape was important, relevant evidence 
in the case because the defense constantly took the position that 
Mr. Onyeabor's accident was not substantial enough to cause the 
injuries complained of by Mr. Onyeabor (T. A-15:16f L-102:6-12, 
0-18:7-19). The defense also tried to prove that Mr. Onyeabor 
probably didn't hit his head during the accident sequence (T. 
A-13-14, D-421). A head trauma is relevant to prove closed-head 
brain injury (T. D-391:16). The video would have shown that a 
sudden deceleration at the speeds involved in Mr. Onyeabor's 
accident could have easily caused his head injury. Therefore, 
the judge committed a serious error in excluding this evidence. 
Plaintiff's offer of Exhibit 114 does not run afoul of 
the hearsay rule. It was being offered as illustrative of Mr. 
Andrews' testimony, i.e., to show the principles of motion to 
which Mr. Andrews had testified. The video is essentially a 
two-minute series of photographs. A photograph which is 
qualified by expert testimony and is a reasonably accurate 
depiction of a relevant matter is often us$d to illustrate the 
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testimony of a witness. Appropriate photographs make testimony 
more readily understood by the trier of fact. Such a photograph 
is admissible and not hearsay. U.S. v. May, 622 F.2d 1000f 1007 
(9th Cir. 1980). A video tape demonstration is admissible to 
illustrate principles that form an expert opinionf even though 
the circumstances of the actual event were different. Gladhill 
v. General Motors Corp., 743 F.2d 1049, 1051 (4th Cir. 1984). 
B. Refusal and reluctance to allow examination by use 
of treatises. On numerous occasions, the court erroneously 
prohibited or seriously hindered Mr. Onyeabor's counsel from 
either establishing a treatise as authoritative or using it to 
rebut testimony raised by a defense expert. The most egregious 
example of this occurred during the rebuttal testimony of Dr. 
Linda Gummow during the eleventh day of trial. In the previous 
week, Dr. Clark had testified for the defense that a loss of 
consciousness is required to have a legitimate closed-head 
organic brain injury (T. L-77-79), and that substantially all of 
the learned literature in the field substantiated that point (T. 
L-109:l, 22; 178:18). Mr. Onyeabor's counsel posed that same 
question to Dr. Linda Gummow on rebuttal (T. M-32-36), and asked 
about the scientific literature. Dr. Gummow indicated that the 
scientific literature did not support Dr. Clark's proposition (T. 
M-32), and she was preparing to quote from treatises to rebut Dr. 
Clark when the court refused to allow it, stating: 
THE COURT: Well, I don't think that on 
her rebuttal testimony here I am going to let 
her read from documents that have not been 
previously considered. ... 
THE COURT: To now say we are going to 
bring in additional witnesses to read 
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additional excerpts from treatises that were 
not mentioned before, I don't think that's 
proper. 
(T. M-33-34). Rule 803(18), Utah Rules of Evidence, however, 
permits an expert to be examined with treatises. In this 
particular case, Mr. Onyeabor's counsel was trying to show that 
Dr. Clark was unfamiliar with the learned literature, which he 
had claimed to know (T. M-34:12-15. Since the adoption of the 
Uniform Rules of Evidence, such statements read from an 
authoritative medical text are admissible ak substantive evidence 
in the case. Jenkins v. Parish, 627 P.2d 533, 539 (Utah 1981). 
The court ultimately let Dr. Gummow read some of the 
articles (T. M-37-39), but only if she would first state her 
opinion and then use the treatise to buttress it. The court's 
unnecessary argumentation and circumscription ruined the 
strategic impact of counsel's cross-examination. 
The issue of a medical text arose again a few minutes 
later when Dr. Gummow intended to read part of DSM III (a 
psychiatric diagnostic manual) to rebut somfe of Dr. Clark's 
diagnosis testimony on personality disorder (T. M-49-53). The 
judge sustained the objection, prohibiting Dr. Gummow from simply 
reading a passage which clearly rebuts Dr. Clark's diagnosis (T. 
M-50). Once again, the court prejudicially blunted the sharp 
focus prepared by counsel to rebut Dr. Clark's erroneous 
testimony. 
The judge also committed error with respect to the use 
of treatises on at least three other occasions during the 
examination of Dr. Gerald Moress (T. D-444-445; D-452), and again 
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during an earlier examination of Dr. Gummow (T. F-841-2). 
Refusal to allow authentication of treatises was grounds for 
reversal in Jenkins v. Parish, supra at 538-539. The Court 
stated: 
The lower court's failure to allow plaintiff 
to independently authenticate professional 
works and consequently to use them on cross-
examination of an adverse expert witness who 
professed no knowledge of the works resulted 
in prejudicial error by substantially 
curtailing plaintiff's ability to attack the 
testimony of Dr. Parish. 
Id. at 539. The refusal to allow authentication and the 
hindering of authentication was strategically harmful to Mr. 
Onyeabor's examination of Dr. Clark. Dr. Clark simply refused to 
acknowledge the authoritativeness of the texts in general, 
insisting that he be directed to certain chapters or passages 
(T. L-175:14). The court thus committed reversible error. 
C. Exclusion of important rebuttal witnesses. The 
court excluded the testimony of Joseph Johnson, Ph.D., and Devra 
Garfinkle, Ph.D., two professors that taught Mr. Onyeabor at the 
University of Utah (T. M-97-102). A proffer was made (T. M-98). 
The professors would have rebutted Dr. Clark's statements that 
Mr. Onyeabor's complaints suggesting brain injury began when 
Onyeabor's current counsel, Mr. Sykes, got involved in the case 
(T. L-148:9-17). Drs. Johnson and Garfinkle were prepared to say 
that they noticed sequelae of a brain injury long before Mr. 
Sykes got involved in the case. It was error to exclude such 
testimony. 
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D. Evidence of plaintiff's plans for the future. The 
court refused to allow Elizabeth Onyeabor, plaintiff's wife, to 
testify regarding their plans for the future if there had been no 
accident (T. J-143). The evidence was relevant to future earning 
capacity because it went to the issue of the types of jobs that 
Mr. Onyeabor could expect to holdf and it helped determine the 
value of the loss. The court labeled Mrs. Onyeabor's testimony 
as hearsay and speculation. In sustaining the objection, the 
court said, "And he's the one to tell us what his future plans 
were." (T. J-143:18). Ironically, when Mr. Onyeabor was later 
called and asked the question put to his wife earlier, the court 
sustained a defense objection again (T. M-3-4). It was error on 
both occasions. 
E. Officer's opinion on fault. The court refused to 
allow Officer Leavitt to testify, based upoh his investigation, 
as to who was at fault in causing the accident (T. B-59-62). 
Officer Leavitt had established himself as an expert in the field 
of accident investigation with many years hands-on experience in 
the area. Under Rules 702 and 704, his testimony should have 
been admissible. In Kelsay v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 749 F.2d 
437 (7th Cir. 1984), the Court held that it was proper for a 
police officer who investigated a train-car crash to opine that 
it resulted from driving inattention. Accord: Gladhill v. 
General Motors Corp., supra (police officer who arrived at scene 
of accident was properly permitted to testify that accident 
resulted from failure to drive within a single lane, and that the 
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accident might have been caused by lack of familiarity with the 
vehicle). 
The prejudice in the exclusion of this testimony is 
obvious. Under the facts of this case, astoundingly, the jury 
found Mr. Onyeabor to be 25% negligent (see discussion in Point 
IV below). 
F. Exhibit 75, a purchase order. The court excluded 
Exhibit 75, a purchase order for a substantial amount of money 
issued to Mr. Onyeabor's company in Nigeria (App. 42) offered to 
show that he had a substantive business in Nigeria (T. G-152). 
The defense objected on grounds of relevance, which the court 
sustained (T. G-152:23-24). However, the exhibit was certainly 
relevant because the defense took the position throughout the 
trial that Mr. Onyeabor was not particularly successful (T. 
L-94-96, 0-34-39) inferring that the company probably belonged to 
his brother, and that Mr. Onyeabor probably worked for his 
brother (T. L-94-95). The purchase order tended to substantiate 
Mr. Onyeabor's substantial lost earning capacity. 
775/P3 
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POINT IV. 
Erroneous Jury Instruction 
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT MR. 
ONYEABOR COULD BE FOUND TO BE CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT 
AND A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT. THERE WAS 
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON WHICH THE JURY COULD BASE SUCH 
A FINDING. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
AND 
APPLICABLE RULES OF LAW 
An erroneous jury instruction which tends to mislead 
the jury or insufficiently or erroneously advises the jury on the 
law, is prejudicial error, Estate of Kesler, supra, if it is 
clear that a correct application would have produced different 
results. Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 669 P.2d 410 
(Utah 1983). The adversely affected party is entitled to have 
the matter adjudicated under correct principles of law. _Id. at 
420. An erroneous instruction is presumptively harmful and 
ground for reversal unless it affirmatively appears in the record 
as a whole that the error was not prejudicial. Agee v. Kahului 
Trucking and Storage, Inc., 688 P.2d 256 (Hawaii 1984); Rowley v. 
Graven Bros, and Co., 491 P.2d 1209 (Utah 1971). One Utah case 
characterized the issue as whether the parties were given a fair 
trial and had the issues of fact and applicable law presented in 
a clear and understandable manner. Callahan v. Wood, 24 Utah 2d. 
8, 465 P.2d 169, 171 (1970). 
To successfully attack a jury verdict on the grounds of 
insufficient evidence, the appellant must marshall all of the 
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evidence supporting the verdict and then demonstrate that, even 
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, 
the evidence is insufficient to support it. Cambelt Int'l. Corp. 
v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1987). 
Generally, factual disputes are matters left to the 
jury. However, if the evidence on an issue so clearly 
preponderates in favor of the appellant that reasonable people 
would not differ on the outcome of the case, then reversible 
error has been committed. E.A. Strout Western Realty Agency, 
Inc. v. W.C. Foy & Sons, Inc., 665 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1983). The 
appellant has a heavy burden to establish that the evidence does 
not support the jury's verdict and the factual findings implicit 
in that verdict. The evidence will be considered in a light most 
favorable to the verdict, and it will not be overturned when it 
is supported by substantial and competent evidence. Von Hake v. 
Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985). 
ARGUMENT 
The court's instructions 21, 20 and 16 (R. 640, 639 and 
634; App. 43) tell the jury that they can find the plaintiff 
negligent with respect to the facts of this case, for allegedly 
failing to keep a proper lookout or for driving too fast for 
existing conditions. Plaintiff's counsel objected strenuously to 
these instructions (T. N-6-8), and specifically to anything in 
the instructions that dealt with plaintiff's alleged negligence 
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(T. N-7:21-22). Plaintiff proposed that language be added to the 
instructions to the effect that the law doe£ not require that a 
driver slow down when approaching an intersection (T. N-8:4-6), 
but that was rejected by the court. 
There is no dispute on the critical aspects of the 
evidence regarding Mr. Onyeabor's approach to the accident scene 
on the day in question. He was driving at or under the speed 
limit (T. B-58); he was completely within his own lane 
(T. B-55:20-25; Ex. 5:2); there were no particular hazards on the 
road or hazardous traffic patterns (T. L-16:19); Mrs. Bates 
claimed she didn't see Mr. Onyeabor because he was partially 
obscured by another vehicle (T. B-47; Ex. 5:2, 4); she proceeded 
to travel almost due west from a private drive across three 
northbound lanes to the point of impact (T. B-50; K-49:12); at 
most, Mr. Onyeabor had between three-quarte|rs of one second and 
one second to react to Mrs. Bates' illegal turn before he began 
his skid, and 1.8 to 2 seconds total in reaction and skid time 
before impact (T. C-114-115); and Mr. Onyeabor was between 250 
and 300 feet from the intersection when Mrs. Bates inaugurated 
the accident sequence (T. C-115-117, K-49:20, C-74-75; Ex. 4). 
There was simply no evidence from which onq could rationally 
conclude that Mr. Onyeabor was negligent. 
The only evidence developed by the defense to impute 
contributory negligence to Mr. Onyeabor came by way of the 
testimony of Mr. Frank Grant, the defense accident reconstruction 
expert. He testified as follows: 
Q (Mr. Stegall): ... Were you able to 
form an opinion as to why the accident 
happened? 
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A (Mr. Grant): Yes. 
Q. What is that opinion? 
A. Bates entered the roadway, made a 
wide right turn so to speak; Mr. Onyeabor was 
traveling too fast to be able to adjust his 
speed in time to avoid her. 
Q. Are there factors at the 
intersection relating to the speed of the 
Onyeabor vehicle with regard to your 
statement of "too fast"? 
A. Yes. I am a little concerned about 
the speed of a vehicle approaching an 
intersection that is as close as the 
intersection of Fort Union Boulevard. It is 
about 100 at the point of impact; is less, 
much less than 100 feet from the stop line at 
Fort Union Boulevard. And given the 
information that I had about the density 
of the traffic at that particular time, the 
type of traffic at that particular time, and 
the intersection, I am a little concerned 
about why would a vehicle still be going at 
45 miles an hour that close to an 
intersection. (Emphasis added) 
(T. K-49-50). That opinion by Mr. Grant was totally without 
foundation and contrary to the facts. Mrs. Bates herself 
testified as follows: 
So I stopped there to look to see if there 
was (sic) any cars coming. T saw a white 
van, and I had plenty of time, so I pulled 
out into the lane and I looked to make sure 
again, and I pulled into the next lane, and 
that's when the collision was. (Emphasis 
added) 
(T. L-16:19). Thus, even Mrs. Bates did not allege any 
particular hazards on the road because there was only one other 
vehicle and she had "plenty of time." She even checked twice. 
Therefore, according to Mrs. Bates' testimony, not only was the 
intersection not busy, there were no particular hazards. 
There is no evidence that the intersection had anything 
to do with the accident. Mr. Grant did not point out any 
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specific hazards or "existing conditions" at the location on the 
day in question that would militate a reduced speed. He vaguely 
implied that the intersection was generally known to be busy (T. 
K-49:21-3), which seems irrelevant given Mrs. Bates1 testimony. 
He was "a little concerned" about the speed of a vehicle as it 
approached that intersection; however, one would need to know 
specific information about hazards to say whether that was a safe 
speed on the day and moment in question. There was absolutely 
nothing pointed out to the jury to indicate that it wasn't a safe 
speed! Unless the defense could show some specific hazard of 
which Mr. Onyeabor should have been aware and which should have 
caused him to slow down, there was no basis for claiming that he 
was negligent. Allowing that issue to go to the jury was simply 
an invitation to speculate on evidence not in the record. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence that had Mr. Onyeabor been 
driving slower, the accident could have been avoided. As pointed 
out in Mr. Andrews' testimony, even if Mr. Onyeabor had been 
driving 40 mph, there still would have been a collision. (T. 
C-120). 
Additionally, there is nothing in the Utah statutes 
which indicates that a driver cannot go the speed limit while 
approaching or crossing an intersection. U.C.A. 1953 
§41-6-46(l)(a) (as amended 1987). Tt is uncontested that the 
speed limit applicable to Mr. Onyeabor was 45 mph (T. B-58, 
K-43:6), and even the defense did not claim that Mr. Onyeabor was 
exceeding the speed limit (T. K-43-46). 
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Essentially, the defense failed to prove any fact that 
would allow a reasonable juror to conclude that Mr. Onyeabor 
was driving too fast for conditions or failing to keep a proper 
lookout. It further failed to prove that even if Mr. Onyeabor 
was somehow negligent, he was a proximate cause of the accident. 
The fact of the matter is that the jury was simply allowed to 
speculate. The jury's prejudice against Mr. Onyeabor was 
demonstrated by the verdict. Under the circumstances recounted 
above, it found Mr. Onyeabor to be 25% negligent. That is an 
astounding result! The verdict should be reversed. 
775/P4 
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POINT V. 
Additur or New Trial 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTING MR. 
ONYEABOR AN ADDITUR. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE COURT 
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTING MR. ONYEABOR'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
AND 
APPLICABLE RULES OF LAW 
Generally, the amount of a jury verdict is a matter 
exclusively for the jury. This is not so, however, where the 
award clearly indicates the jury's disregard of competent 
evidence or the influence of passion or prejudice. Batty v. 
Mitchell, 575 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1978). An additur is justified if 
it seems clear that the jury has misapplied or failed to take 
into account proven facts; or misunderstood or disregarded the 
law; or made findings clearly against the weight of the evidence. 
Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (1961). 
An appellate court should reverse! a trial court's 
failure to grant a motion for a new trial only if the trial court 
abused its discretion. Crellin v. Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 247 P.2d 
264 (1952). A trial judge may grant a new trial only if the 
jury's verdict is so contrary to the manifest weight of the 
evidence that the judge "cannot in good conscience permit it to 
stand." Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435, 441, 326 P.2d 722, 726 
(1958) (concurring opinion of Crockett and Wade, JJ); Goddard v. 
Hickman, 685 P.2d 530 (Utah 1984). The judge should order a new 
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trial in those rare cases when the jury verdict is manifestly 
against the weight of the evidence. Goddardf supra at 532. 
ARGUMENT 
- The Back Injury -
There was undisputed evidence that Mr. Onyeabor 
suffered a herniated lumbar disc as a proximate result of the 
accident. This was admitted by the defense orthopedic expert, 
Dr. Edward Spencer (T. 1-10:19), who gave Mr. Onyeabor a 10% 
permanent partial impairment rating (T. 1-19). On 
cross-examination, Dr. Spencer admitted that the Manual for 
Orthopedic Surgeons in Evaluating Permanent Physical Impairment, 
published by the American Academy for Orthopedic Surgeons, was 
authoritative (T. 1-32), and that the most likely scenario for 
Mr. Onyeabor, under that rating system, would indicate a 20% 
permanent partial impairment for a herniated disc (T. 1-33-34). 
Dr. Thomas Soderberg, a well-known orthopedic surgeon, rated Mr. 
Onyeabor's permanent impairment from the herniated disc at 20% 
without surgery and 10% with surgery, if the surgery was 
successful (T. D-362). (Dr. Soderberg also gave Mr. Onyeabor a 
10% permanent partial impairment rating due to his neck injury 
suffered in the accident (T. D-362).) Dr. Gerald Moress, a 
prominent Salt Lake neurologist, gave Mr. Onyeabor a 10% 
permanent partial impairment due to the herniated disc, if the 
surgery were successful (T. D-410), but a 20% permanent partial 
impairment if the surgery were not successful and he did not 
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expect it to be successful because of Mr. Onyeabor's lack of 
emotional stability (T. D-411-412). 
Mr. Onyeabor received a verdict from the jury for 
$16,850.00 (R. 663), almost exactly the amount suggested by Mr. 
Stegall in his closing argument (T. O-34-40). It is common 
knowledge that a herniated disc case has a value of $40,000 to 
$50,000 to settle in Salt Lake County. The amount of the 
verdict, considering just the back injury alone, suggests passion 
and prejudice by the jury, and is grossly inadequate. 
- The Brain Injury -
Three doctors testified for plainltiff who are qualified 
to evaluate permanent impairment from a brain injury. Dr. 
Moress, a neurologist, testified that Mr. Onyeabor's impairment 
for the brain injury was 35%, for a total df 42% when combined 
with the back injury (T. D-417). Dr. Richard Goka, a Salt Lake 
physiatrist (a specialist in rehabilitation medicine), and the 
medical director at the Department of Rehabilitation Medicine at 
Holy Cross Hospital, considered the brain Injury impairment to be 
36% (T. E-538). Dr. Duncan Wallace, a Salt Lake psychiatrist and 
the former president of the Utah Psychiatric Association (T. 
E-651), indicated that Mr. Onyeabor's permanent overall 
impairment due to the brain injury was 34% (T. F-710:23). 
The defense produced no substantial, believable 
evidence to the effect that Mr. Onyeabor did not have a brain 
injury due to the accident. Dr. Robert Cook, the defense 
psychologist, admittedly had little or no experience in the area 
of head injury. He was not familiar with any of the major texts 
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on head injury (T. K-121). At his deposition, Dr. Cook was asked 
the following question, which was read to him at trial: 
Mr. Sykes: "So you feel that you're not 
qualified to do a primary examination to 
determine if someone is organically brain 
injured"? 
Answer: "Yes, I would say that." 
(Emphasis added) 
(T. K-125:8; Cook deposition p. 39:5). Dr. Cook further admitted 
that organic brain injury was not one of his "specialties" (T. K-
124:9-25). Dr. Cook was not familiar with brain injury 
terminology (T. K-123-124, K-126-127, K-128:20, K-129:6, 
K-129:22, K-130:13). Seventy-five percent of Dr. Cook's 
professional income came from doing court evaluations for defense 
attorneys and insurance companies (T. K-134:6). In the ten years 
prior to his testimony, Dr. Cook had seen perhaps 12 or 13 
patients who had brain damage, but did not see them or treat them 
for that purpose (T. K-137-138:2). In fact, Dr. Cook had never 
even treated anybody for organic brain injury (T. K-138:6). In 
summary, it would have been very difficult for a fair jury to 
give much credence to any opinion that Dr. Cook had on the issue 
of brain injury. 
Dr. Lincoln Clark testified very cogently to the effect 
that Mr. Onyeabor did not have organic brain injury (T. L-101-
102). Undoubtedly, Dr. Clark was a main reason for the jury's 
low verdict. Dr. Clark should not have been allowed to testify 
on brain injury (see discussion in Point II above). Even so, his 
opinion should have been of questionable value to an unprejudiced 
jury. In a March, 1986, trial, he had not considered himself to 
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be a "specialist" on brain injury (T. L-113,114). He had only 
become an expert in his own mind through court cases that he had 
during that intervening year (T. L-114). H^ credited plaintiff's 
counsel, Mr. Sykes, with having helped him to become an expert in 
the area (T. L-114). 
The verdict reflects the jury's belief that Mr. 
Onyeabor did not have a head injury. That is obviously a result 
of the prejudice engendered by a combination of the judge's 
comments on the evidence, judicial interjections and 
interruptions, erroneous evidentiary rulingls and instructions, 
and perhaps other latent prejudices. The Court would be 
justified in granting Mr. Onyeabor's Motion for an Additur in an 
amount far in excess of $200,000^, the amount originally 
requested. This is fair, and preferable td granting a new trial. 
Mr. Onyeabor expended (or incurred liabilities) in excess of 
$30,000 in costs to prepare and try the case, plus $6,500 for 
appellate transcripts. Absent the prejudice engendered by the 
numerous comments on the evidence and otheif errors, Mr. Onyeabor 
certainly would have had a verdict in excess of $200,000, that 
being a low amount. Therefore, rather than burden the Court 
system with a re-trial of this case, the Cpurt should simply 
grant a reasonable additur. Tn the alternative, the Court should 
grant a new trial because the evidence was insufficient to 
justify the verdict. 
1 / Mr. Onyeabor turned down a settlement offer of $125,000 prior 
to trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
The lower court made in excess of 40 comments on the 
evidence by way of direct statements and/or unwarranted 
interjections and interruptions. Many of these comments were 
extremely prejudicial and tended to cast Mr. Onyeabor's experts 
and evidence in substantial disrepute in the eyes of the jury. 
The court unduly interfered with Mr. Onyeabor's presentation of 
evidence and cross-examination of witnesses. The court's 
demeanor and body language during the trial demonstrated 
favoritism toward the defendants' case, and communicated the 
court's belief that the quality and credibility of Mr. Onyeabor's 
evidence was lacking. This caused Mr. Onyeabor extreme prejudice 
and denied him a fair trial. 
Dr. Clark's reappearance in the case as an expert 
witness for the defense was a surprise which Mr. Onyeabor could 
not have guarded against in the exercise of reasonable caution. 
Lack of notice of Dr. Clark as a witness and failure to provide a 
timely, complete report appear to have been the result of 
contumacious conduct, and should not be sanctioned by the Court. 
It denied Mr. Onyeabor the right to effective cross-examination, 
and significantly prejudiced his case. 
There were numerous evidentiary errors, including the 
erroneous exclusion of relevant admissible evidence and improper 
jury instructions. Mr. Onyeabor was thereby prejudiced. Each of 
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the erroneous exclusions of evidence, or other evidentiary 
errors, constituted reversible error. 
The cumulative effect of the comments on the evidence, 
the judicial interruptions, the admission of Dr. Clark's 
testimony, and the evidentiary errors was devastating to the 
Mr. Onyeabor's case. 
The Court should grant Mr. Onyeabpr's Motion for an 
Additur in a reasonable amount. This would( avoid the wasteful 
necessity of trying the case again. In the alternative, the 
Court should reverse the trial court and remand this case for a 
new trial on all issues. 
DATED this 22nd day of July, 1988|• 
ROBERr B. S Y K E S " 7 C 
Attorney for Appellant 
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